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Abstract 
Neoliberalism is often viewed as a global intellectual movement detached from the ideas and politi-
cal economy of the individual nation-state. However, the origins of what has subsequently been de-
scribed as neoliberalism were heavily based on the intellectual traditions of the nation-state. Early 
British neoliberalism drew heavily on the thoughts and ideas of British classical liberal philosophers 
and political economists to justify their arguments on why the economy should be free to operate 
under market conditions. British neoliberalism rather than being detached from the intellectual tra-
dition of British classical liberalism embraced some core tenets with the early neo-liberal theorists 
seeking to update and modernise the classical pillars of the British liberal tradition whilst recognis-
ing the flaws of nineteenth-century laissez-faire liberalism and capitalism. The goal of this was to 
create a new type of liberalism and deliver a distinctive alternative to the prevailing collectivist 
movements of the 1930s and 1940s which would ultimately have influence in the 1970s and 1980s 
with the government of Margaret Thatcher and beyond. 
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Classical Liberalism redefined?: The intellectual origins and  
development of British Neoliberalism 1929 - 1955 
Neoliberalism is an intellectual and ideological concept which has generated a significant amount of 
academic debate since the ascendancy of several political leaders during the 1970s and 1980s. Their 
backgrounds were varied, the systems of government which they represent different ranging from 
autocracy to democracy but each one had a common trait; a belief in market liberalism - the process 
in which an economic system is governed by limited government control and allows market forces 
to guide the economy. The traditional historiographical narrative is that in the West, the election of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in 1980 saw both leaders elected with the goal of 
reversing the stagflation years of the 1970s to bring economic rejuvenation through deregulation, 
controlled monetary policy and privatisation. However, the narrative is broader and more diverse 
than just the Atlantic world. In 1975, the first ‘neoliberal’ experiment was established under the au-
thoritarian dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet in Chile  compared with the democracies of 1
America and Britain. Pinochet, like Thatcher and Reagan, set about reducing government control 
over the economy by controlling inflation through monetarist ideas, developing private enterprise 
and selling off the state-owned industries and utilities. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping became the leader 
of Communist China and set about moving the moving the country from a command economy of 
the Maoist era to the capitalist, industrial superpower that we see today. With these political leaders 
and the programmes which they pursued has meant that since the 1980s the term ‘neoliberalism’ has 
generated a considerable amount of academic literature to explain how this shift in global economic 
management came into being when in 1970 the mixed economy seemed so dominant; particularly 
in Western Europe and the United States. 
 This has meant that because of the recentness of the emergence of neoliberalism as a distinc-
tive concept that the term itself has numerous interpretations and has evolved over time spurred on 
by academic discourse. Indeed, although the word itself can be traced back to the time period dis-
cussed in this thesis, the word only entered the academic mainstream in the late 1990s. In the 1970s, 
the majority of the ideas which would today be described as ‘neoliberal’ would have been charac-
 “The first country in the world to make that momentous break with the past—away from socialism and extreme state 1
capitalism toward more market-oriented structures and policies—was not Deng Xiaoping’s China or Margaret Thatch-
er’s Britain in the late 1970s, Ronald Reagan’s United States in 1981, or any other country in Latin America or else-
where. It was Pinochet’s Chile in 1975.” Robert A. Packenham, William Ratliff. “What Pinochet Did for Chile” Hoover 
Digest, Hoover Institute, (1, 2007). http://www.hoover.org/research/what-pinochet-did-chile
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terised as the ‘New Right’  and the word neoliberal would not appear, with political scientists, soci2 -
ologists and commentators looking at the movement as a new, market-orientated version of the po-
litical right . Indeed, an early analysis of what would now be recognised as neoliberalism for the 3
Fabian Society was titled the New Right: A Critique and identified, one of the subjects of this thesis, 
the Institute of Economic Affairs as a ‘New Right’ organisation . In the 1980s, most academics and 4
commentators examining the ideological trends would refer to Thatcherism and Reaganism respec-
tively, not neoliberalism. Neoliberalism has only become the accepted term when discussing these 
ideas in the last decade. Since then, the study of neoliberalism evolved into a interdisciplinary line 
of academic enquiry with sociologist, historians, political scientist and economists all writing about 
this important turn in global history which occurred in the late 1970s and 1980s. As well as the re-
cent nature of the term ‘neoliberalism’ in academic discourse, the word also comes with a number 
of other caveats which should be taken into consideration given the complex nature of the debates 
around neoliberalism as a concept. One such caveat, which this thesis will explore is that those who 
were involved in the development of neoliberalism often would not use the term themselves. The 
term neoliberalism is something which has been retrospectively used to define the concept and the 
people who advanced its agenda. As such when we discuss neoliberal theorists it is through the 
framework of the academia explaining why these people and institutions are promulgated a new 
version of liberalism which is distinct to what came before. This creates two problems. Firstly, the 
retrospective nature of the term has meant that it is something which an individual is labeled with 
rather than describes themselves as, meaning that what the early individuals behind the ‘neoliberal’ 
movement in Britain call themselves is left to others, academics and public discourse, rather than 
what they considered the intellectual traditions of the movement. The second issue, is that it has led 
to a hostility to the concept of neoliberalism in general. This is because the term has taken on such 
political significance in modern Britain politics that the public discourse around the term is often 
partisan and at times counter-factual, particularly in popular histories and the media.  Indeed, nu-
merous articles and popular books have been published since the financial crisis of 2008 to de-
nounce neoliberalism as the root of today’s societal ills with the term being used as a pejorative. 
The author and journalist George Monbiot is a good example of what the popular discourse on ne-
oliberalism looks like and how the ideology is conveyed to the wider public. In Monbiot's How We 
 David Green. The New Right: The Counterrevolution in Political, Economic and Social Thought, (Brighton: Wheat2 -
sheaf Books, 1987)
David Green, The New Right: The Counterrevolution in Political, Economic and Social Thought, (Brighton: Wheat3 -
sheaf Books, 1987)
 David Collard, The New Right - A Critique, (London: Fabian Society, 1968) 1.4
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Got Into this Mess? in 2016 and was followed up with an article in the Guardian newspaper, he de-
nounces ‘neoliberalism’ as a corrupt and self-serving ideology . Interestingly, Monbiot states that 5
“The anonymity of neoliberalism is fiercely guarded. Those who are influenced by Hayek, Mises 
and Friedman tend to reject the term, maintaining – with some justice – that it is used today only 
pejoratively. But they offer us no substitute. Some describe themselves as classical liberals or liber-
tarians, but these descriptions are both misleading and curiously self-effacing, as they suggest that 
there is nothing novel about The Road to Serfdom, Bureaucracy or Friedman’s classic work, Capi-
talism and Freedom.” . Indeed, Monbiot’s analysis would suggest that neoliberalism has not got an 6
intellectual tradition of its own, as Monbiot dismisses any suggestion that the thinkers who call 
themselves “classical liberals” or “libertarians” are not representing an intellectual tradition but in-
stead creating an ideology divorced from any intellectual traditions.  Monbiot is highlighting the 
exact issue and difficulty in defining neoliberalism as a coherent term with both the twin issues of 
retrospective application and hostility in popular discourse, ‘neoliberalism’ is used as something to 
brand someone with rather than an ideology which can have its strengths, weaknesses and inconsis-
tencies in an intellectual sense. This is coupled with the plethora of definitions offered by academics 
and the highly interdisciplinary nature of the study of neoliberalism has created a deficit in the liter-
ature analysing the intellectual roots and development of neoliberalism. 
 Despite all the academic research generated and recent development in the past decade the 
term ‘neoliberalism’ remains a concept with no one definitive definition. The origins of the word 
are even disputed, some have suggested the first use of the term came from a Swedish Social De-
mocrat writing in the 1920s . A more likely origin of the term, when academics discuss neoliberal7 -
ism in the sense of limited intervention and free markets, appeared at a conference held in 1938 in 
honour of the American journalist and liberal author Walter Lippmann and was coined by a German 
delegate at the meeting to denote the need for a new liberal revival . However, defining neoliberal8 -
ism has been largely left to academia, as mentioned with the evolution of academic analysis stem-
ming from the New Right to Thatcherism to Neoliberalism over the past 40 years. Will Davies, a 
political economist, characterised the problems in defining neoliberalism as the result of the in-
 George Monbiot. How did we got into this mess? (London: Verso, 2016). George Monbiot ‘Neoliberalism – the ideol5 -
ogy at the root of all our problems’ The Guardian, 15 April 2016. Date Accessed 27/04/2017 https://www.theguardian.-
com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-problem-george-monbiot
 Mobiot, “Neoliberalism: the root of all our problems” The Guardian, 15 April 20166
 Philip Mirowski, and Dieter, Plehwe, eds. The Road from Mont Pèlerin : The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Col7 -
lective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.)
 Mirowski & Plehwe, eds. The Road from Mont Pèlerin : The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective. introduc8 -
tion
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terdisciplinary nature of the term. Davies states that “The reason ‘neoliberalism’ appears to defy 
easy definition (especially to those with an orthodox training in economics or policy science) is that 
it refers to a necessarily interdisciplinary, colonising process” . According to Davies, this means 9
that a settled definition is difficult when neoliberalism intersects with other disciplines so readily. 
The anthropologist and geographer David Harvey, in his comprehensive study of neoliberalism de-
fined neoliberalism as “[Neoliberalism is] in the first instance a theory of political economic prac-
tices that propose that human well-being can be best advanced by liberating individual en-
trepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutionalised framework characterised by strong pri-
vate property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an 
institutional framework appropriate to such practices.” . The sociologist Stephanie Lee Mudge 10
went further describing neoliberalism as having three central ‘facets’ - the bureaucratic, political 
and intellectual which makes up the concept of neoliberalism . The Bureaucratic element, accord11 -
ing to Mudge, is one based in the state functions of deregulation and market liberalisation, the polit-
ical element is based on “a new market-centric ‘politics’—struggles over political authority that 
share a particular ideological centre or, in other words, are underpinned by an unquestioned ‘com-
mon sense” . The final facet, according to Mudge, is the intellectual, which is the focus of this 12
work, in which neoliberalism “is distinguished by (a) its Anglo-American-anchored transnationali-
ty; (b) its historical gestation within the institutions of welfare capitalism and the Cold War divide 
and (c) an unadulterated emphasis on the (disembedded) market as the source and arbiter of human 
freedoms.” . Both Mudge's and Harvey’s definitions of what neoliberalism is highlights the com13 -
plex nature of this ideological doctrine which we seek to explain. For the purposes of this thesis, I 
have interpreted neoliberalism broadly in the form which David Harvey does, that economic free-
dom, characterised by free markets and free trade, is core principle and the state is there to provided 
the institutional framework to create and protect the conditions for individual liberty. 
 Despite the issues around the term itself, the development of neoliberalism and the subse-
quent historiographical research conducted is extensive. However, one area of research in the histo-
ry of neoliberalism which is lacking is about the ideology’s intellectual development within indi-
 Will Davies ‘The Difficulty of Neoliberalism’ Political Economy Research Centre http://www.perc.org.uk/project_9 -
posts/the-difficulty-of-neoliberalism/
 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 2.  10
 Stephanie Lee Mudge, “What is Neoliberalism?” Socio-Economic Review, Volume 6, Issue 4, 1 October 2008, Pages 11
703–731 https://academic.oup.com/ser/article/6/4/703/1739555/What-is-neo-liberalism
 idib 12
 idib 13
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vidual states and where neoliberalism fits within the intellectual traditions of individual states. Al-
though Harvey, Mudge, Davies and Monbiot do discuss the intellectual origins its emphasis is more 
on the global rather than the national intellectual traditions of neoliberalism. This thesis seeks to 
explore the internal domestic development of British neoliberalism, to see how the early ‘neoliber-
als’ used domestic intellectual traditions to make neoliberalism adaptable to the United Kingdom. 
For example, British neoliberalism has little in common with the German experience of neoliberal-
ism in the form of the Sociale Marktwirtschaft (social-market economy) and Ordoliberalismus as 
pioneered by Röpke and others . However, the majority of academic discourse has focused on the 14
core concepts which transcend national boundaries with little focus on the domestic intellectual tra-
ditions which feed into local neoliberalism. In recent years, this imbalance is starting to be re-
dressed, Ben Jackson has written extensively in recent years on the development of neoliberalism in 
the domestic intellectual sphere  but his account does focus largely on the politicians convinced by 15
the doctrine. This thesis seeks to add to this developing area of the historiography by focusing upon 
the impact of British classical liberalism tradition in helping to form a distinctive brand of neoliber-
alism in the United Kingdom, which has formed the basis of my academic research.  
 The reason for examining the longer British tradition of classical liberalism and its subse-
quent influence on neoliberalism is to understand how this concept we now call neoliberalism fits 
into the intellectual traditions of nation. Great Britain has a long tradition of liberal thinkers in the 
economic sphere starting with John Locke, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, however, this longer 
tradition remains largely absent from discussions regarding the intellectual traditions of neoliberal-
ism in Britain. Indeed, from the mid nineteenth century to the fall of the last purely Liberal Party 
government in Britain in 1915, the Liberal Party was a strong party of government, with its leader 
William Gladstone holding 4 separate ministries between 1868 and 1892. Furthermore, Britain had 
a considerable socio-political movement which supported Free Trade, one of the hallmarks of Ne-
oliberalism in the post-war era although often referred to as trade liberalisation, which when mo-
bilised saw the Liberal Party returned to power with a landslide in 1906 over the increasing de-
mands within the Conservative Party for economic protectionism . This longer background of both 16
intellectual liberalism in the form of John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith and John Locke as well as the 
 Ralf Ptak ‘Neoliberalism in Germany: Revisiting the Ordoliberal Foundations of the Social Market Economy’ in 14
Mirowski & Plehwe, eds. The Road from Mont Pèlerin : The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective pp 98-138
 Ben Jackson, ‘At the origins of neo-liberalism: the free economy and the strong state 1930 - 1947’ The Historical 15
Journal, 53, 1 (2010), pp. 129-151, ‘Currents of Neo-Liberalism: British Political Ideologies and the New Right, c. 
1955-79’, English Historical Review, 131(551) (2016), pp. 823-50
 Douglas, History of the Liberal Party 1895 - 1970 (London: Sedwick & Jackson, 1971) 34-3516
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tangible political success of the Liberal Party meant that Britain had a tradition of liberalism which 
could feed into the development of neoliberalism in mid-twentieth century Britain and formulate 
into what we would recognise today as neoliberalism. 
 The starting point of this research was to look at the individuals and institutions which 
would be involved in creating the fledgling neoliberalism, which would rise to such dominance in 
the 1970s and beyond. Indeed, this thesis examines those who in later life would be called neoliber-
als perceived their own works and endeavours to revive ‘liberal’ economics in the era of Keynesian-
ism and the post-war consensus. To this end, I found that many of the individuals who influenced 
the creation of many of the institutions now associated with the neoliberal counter-revolution such 
as the Institute of Economic Affairs or the Mont Pèlerin Society, were on the whole, members of the 
Liberal Party or associated with the London School of Economics before the Second World War. 
Indeed, the individuals this thesis will focus on, at different times between 1929 and 1956 played an 
important role in the intellectual development of neoliberalism in Britain. These individuals are 
Friedrich von Hayek, lecturer at the London School of Economics from 1931 and founder of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society in 1947, Lionel Robbins, Chair of the LSE’s economics department and gov-
ernment advisor, Arthur Seldon, student at the LSE and future editorial director of the Institute for 
Economic Affairs and Elliott Dodds, Liberal Party member who held various Party executive roles 
including Party President. Other individuals who will be mentioned but not in as much depth within 
this thesis will be Ernest Benn, Liberal Party member and businessman who founded the Society for 
Individualists in 1942 and, Alan Peacock; Liberal Party advisor, IEA fellow and founder-member of 
the University of York’s Economics department. Many of the individuals and institution which are 
to be discussed in this thesis would not have described themselves not as ‘neoliberals’ during this 
period but simply as classical liberals or liberals which would indicate that these individuals did not 
consider their writings or works to be divorced from the longer intellectual traditions of classical 
liberalism which already had a significant intellectual history within the United Kingdom. Indeed, 
most of the individuals discussed in this thesis sought to revive liberalism as political and philo-
sophical concept especially F.A Hayek, as this thesis will show, consistently discussed the need for 
a liberal revival during the 1930s and 1940s.  
 This thesis is predominately a work of intellectual history, looking at the intellectual devel-
opment of neoliberalism rather than its political consequences, however, at certain points the practi-
cal realms of politics will feature especially in discussions of the Liberal Party during the 1930s. 
One of the hypotheses of this thesis is that with the collapse of the Liberal Party in the 1930s due to 
internal splits, many of the individuals discussed in the preceding paragraph decided to pursue their 
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agenda outside the Liberal Party to convince opinion formers to engage with the ideas promulgated 
by the early neoliberals, particularly Arthur Seldon and Ernest Benn who both joined external 
groups outside the party dedicated to market liberalism. The methodological approach of this thesis 
will focus on the institutions and individuals themselves by explaining the writings of these indi-
viduals and highlighting and contextualising the crossovers between British classical liberalism and 
neoliberalism. This will assist to build up a picture of what these individuals are thinking and where 
their writings fit into the intellectual traditions of classical liberalism. The main section of this the-
sis will then look at the individuals and institutions aforementioned to see what ideas they held and 
how those ideas are linked to the development of neoliberalism in the interwar and post-war period. 
To do this, I have conducted archival research into the papers of these individuals particularly cor-
respondence, government and committee papers and as well as published works such as Hayek’s 
Road to Serfdom to examine the classical liberal ideas behind their writings. This archival research 
has been difficult as most of the papers particularly concerning the IEA and the Mont Pèlerin Soci-
ety are held in the Hoover Institute at Stanford University, however, I have been able to use the ex-
tensive secondary literature around this subject to piece together gaps in the primary research. This 
will show that despite the global context to the formation of neoliberalism, through various domes-
tic institutions, there is a longer intellectual tradition behind the arguments proposed by these indi-
viduals. This does not mean that the argument is the same in the longue dureé of liberal intellectual 
history in Britain, but, that there are clear intellectual traditions at the basis of the early ‘neoliberals’ 
writings. Intertwined with this is what the individuals themselves did and how this assisted in the 
development of neoliberal ideology in Britain. This should build a picture of the intellectual dy-
namism in the early neoliberal movement that did not start after the war but before to develop into 
the fledging ideology which would ultimately be successful in overturning the dominant post-war 
consensus with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. 
I 
The first two sections of this thesis are going to focus on the London School of Economics and the 
Liberal Party during the 1930s. During this period, the London School of Economics and certain 
sections of Liberal Party intersected heavily in the development of neoliberalism by seeking to re-
fine and restate classical liberal principle which were prevalent in the British liberal tradition; par-
ticularly in the realms of economics. Due to the fluid nature of the development of neoliberalism 
during the 1930s, this thesis for the ease of analysis will focus on each institution in turn, starting 
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with the London School of Economics, which was the intellectual powerhouse behind the neoliberal 
movement but references to both will be made throughout this section.  
 The London School of Economics would seem an unlikely home for the early intellectual 
development of neoliberalism. The School was founded in 1895 by a group of Fabian Society 
members - Sidney and Beatrice Webb, George Bernard Shaw and Graham Wallas - with the aim to 
create an institution dedicated to the betterment of society . The Fabian Society, as an institution, 17
was on the progressive wing of late Victorian and Edwardian politics often taking a radical liberal 
or socialist stance on many social issues during the fin de siècle. Indeed, Sidney Webb, later Lord 
Passfield, was a radical liberal councillor on the London County Council in the 1890s  but later, 18
like many Fabians, became supporters of socialist ideology and the Labour Party. Many of this early 
generation of Fabians, like the Webb and Bernard Shaw were involved in the creation of the Labour 
Representation Committee, later called the Labour Party, in 1900. The Webbs believed in the even-
tual triumph of socialism as an inevitability, as such teaching at the LSE encompassed all variety of 
opinions even from its inception. However, the LSE’s economics department stood out as a notable 
exception to the Webbs assumption. As Cockett, in his Thinking the Unthinkable, notes that “the 
Fabians probably believed all ‘disinterested’ and ‘objective’ academic research would lead any in-
telligent person down the path of collectivism and socialism… but this was not true of the eco-
nomics department” . By the 1920s, William Beveridge, a liberal who had helped devise the first 19
welfare reforms during the 1906 Liberal Ministry, was the director of the LSE and the institution 
boasted a large number of academics from the progressive side of the political spectrum such as 
Hugh Dalton, future Labour chancellor and Harold Laski. However, in the Economics department, 
before the tenure of Robbins, the LSE economic department was dominated by Edwin Cannan. 
Cannan wrote a critique of economic nationalism and management called An Economist’s Protest 
over the conduct of government during the Great War , he also authored a version of Adam Smith’s 20
Wealth of Nations.  Keith Tribe notes that Cannan’s belief, whilst old-fashioned in the 1920s, influ-
enced his students considerably, notably Lionel Robbins and Arnold Plant . This eclectic mix of 21
 Ralf Darhendorf LSE: history of the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1895-1995 (Oxford, Oxford 17
University Press, 1995) pp1-10
 Dahrendorf, LSE, 5 18
 Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unithinkable: Thintanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution 1931 1983 (London: 19
Harper Collins, 1995) 29
 Keith Tribe, ‘Liberalism and Neoliberalism in Britain 1930 - 1980’ in Mirowski and Plehwe, Road from Mont Pè20 -
lerin, 78
 Keith Tribe, ‘Liberalism and Neoliberalism’.7821
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backgrounds and academic variety meant that the LSE was a diverse intellectual environment dur-
ing the 1920s and 1930s, with no one prevailing ideology dominating the LSE’s direction. As Ralf 
Dahrendorf points out the institution was not just created in a liberal zeitgeist but one in which con-
tained numerous intellectual ideas with no one idea being dominant at the School . In this context 22
it is unsurprising that the birth of neoliberal ideas of state and economic management in Britain 
were born at the LSE, as the institution accommodated all intellectual and academic views relating 
to the realms of economics and political science due in accordance with its founders beliefs. 
 It was in this climate of intellectual plurality at the LSE where the early neoliberal move-
ment developed its first academic and intellectual powerhouse in Britain. This situation came as a 
result of the leadership of Lionel Robbins, who was appointed Chair of Political Economy in 1929. 
Robbins was a convert to classical liberal economics, originally, like many of his age starting out as 
guild socialist in the traditions of the Fabian Society. However, during the Great Depression, Rob-
bins became a fervent defender of classical liberal economics, as his academic career progressed. 
However, Robbins differed to many of his British contemporaries as he was interested in develop-
ments in continental economics and in particular he became increasingly influenced by the Austrian 
school. This was compared to the overwhelming dominance of Marshallian economics in Britain. 
The Austrian School of economics differed from the economic orthodoxy of classical and neoclas-
sical economics in regards to the theory of value; the price at which goods and services are ex-
changed. To classical and neoclassical economists such as Ricardo and Marx, value is derived from 
the factors of production such as Labour, raw materials and, investment. Conversely Austrian 
School economists argue that the theory of value is subjective based on the prejudices, assumptions 
and preferences of an individual actor not just the factors or means of production which so obsessed 
earlier thinkers of political economy in Britain . As Israel Kirzner notes that “Ricardo and the cur23 -
rent neoclassical economics exhibits a mechanical quality whereby human aspiration, human error 
and, human discoveries are downplayed, ignored or simply assumed away” . Ralph Raico sum24 -
marises “Austrian economics begins with and constantly emphasises the action of the individual 
human being” . 25
 Dahrendorf, LSE, 1022
 David Green, The New Right: The Counterrevolution in Political, Economic and Social Thought, (Brighton: Wheat23 -
sheaf Books, 1987) 138
 Israel Kirzner in Ralph Raico, Classical Liberalism and the Austrian School, (Alabama: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 24
2012) 8-9
 Riaco, Classical Liberalism and the Austrian School, p.725
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 This subsequently leads to other fundamental differences in methodology. The Austrian 
school focuses on microeconomics, looking at individuals and businesses rather than the increasing-
ly popular ideas of Keynes during this period, which tended towards macroeconomics. This was the 
crucial difference between the two schools, which both Hayek and Robbins agree, is that looking at 
national issues such as full employment, national incomes and aggregate demand is misconceived 
as the levels of value are not constant, as Keynesian macroeconomics assumes . These tensions 26
would become critical to the debates which Hayek, Robbins and others at the LSE would conduct 
with their rivals under Keynes at Cambridge. This interest in the Austrian school would have a pro-
found impact on teaching at the LSE in the 1930s because of Robbins’ decision to invite the Austri-
an economist Frederich von Hayek to come to teach at the LSE. This decision is highly significant 
to the development of British neoliberalism in the coming years on which this thesis is examining. 
Hayek was a well-known continental economist who had been under the tutelage of Ludwig von 
Mises, one of the father of the Austrian School, at the University of Vienna. Both Robbins and 
Hayek had met at Mises’ Privatseminars in the early 1920s . It is with the appointment of Hayek to 27
the Tooke Chair, which had been vacant since 1919, and Robbins’ own interest in the arguments of 
the Austrian school that signified a break with the previous Marshallian tradition which had domi-
nated economics in Britain since the late nineteenth century. Indeed, Cockett notes Robbins at the 
London School of Economics helped to bring continental ideas in economic theory to the United 
Kingdom, which may have been lost in significance .  28
 It is this international element which does make many academics question whether a native 
neoliberal intellectual tradition can exist given the influence of external intellectual traditions on the 
formation of British neoliberalism. Hayek being a native Austrian as well as an Austrian school 
economist and Robbins as someone who examined and agreed with the Austrian school, would ap-
pear divorced from the principles of British liberal intellectual tradition, particularly in regards to 
the fundamental basis of classical economics espoused by Ricardo and Smith. However, when one 
examines the nature of the intellectual arguments behind the Austrian school, the picture becomes 
one of remarkable similarity. Both schools of thought, British classical liberalism and the Austrian 
school value the individual’s liberty above all and are commitment to limited intervention within 
the market. Despite the ideological and philosophical differences between the various types of polit-
ical liberalism, the main principle which unites the opposing strands is the primacy of importance 
 David Green, The New Right, 14026
 Mirowski and Plehwe, 1227
 Cockrett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 2728
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which liberal theorists place on the concept of liberty. Indeed it is the main fundamental principle 
which is consistent across the intellectual tradition of not just British liberalism, but of western lib-
eralism in general . In the British intellectual tradition of classical liberalism, the main interpreta29 -
tion of liberty and freedom is derived from concept of negative freedom, as opposed to positive 
freedom.  The theory of positive and negative freedom which was proposed by the philosopher Isa-
iah Berlin in his 1958 inaugural lecture at Oxford  characterises two types of freedom, but, its in30 -
fluence stretches right through discussion of liberalism from the seventeenth century, with John 
Stuart Mill and John Locke taking the negative view of freedom . Hayek himself would later note 31
the negative freedom concept of the liberal tradition in his Road to Serfdom, which will be exam-
ined in greater detail later in this thesis. 
 This concept of negative freedom, which is seen in both British classical liberalism and the 
political economy of the Austrian school, is the concept that to be truly free and have liberty, as an 
individual or group, you must be free from obstacles to carry out your own actions. Put in its sim-
plest terms, negative freedom takes liberty as a mere absence of obstacles, constraints and coercion; 
whereas positive freedom seems to require the presence of something such as control or regulation 
to enable people to be free .  This means that the individual must have self-determination and be 32
free to carry out their own individual will without the threat or risk of coercion. With the premise of 
negative freedom, British classical liberal theory of state governance and economic management 
becomes one of limited intervention with the life of the private individual and of the market; as to 
intervene would impede the individual’s liberty . Jeppe von Platz and John Tomasi in their analysis 33
of economic liberalism draw the distinction that for classical liberals, economic liberties are basic 
liberties, which do not triumph over other rights “Thus, in classical liberalism, the economic liber-
ties are not quite basic, since they can be regulated by reference to the underlying values – but in 
this the economic liberties are once again on a par with the other (more or less basic) liberties” . 34
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 Intrinsically linked to the concept of negative freedom and the place it holds in British clas-
sical liberalism is the emphasis which is placed on the individual, particularly in the realms of eco-
nomics. The Austrian school similarly take the view that this individualism stems from the early 
liberal philosophers of the eighteenth century particularly Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham in the 
realms of economic liberalism. The classical liberal argument is that a human being is a rational ac-
tor and as such holds their own self-interest at the core of their actions. The argument stems from 
the Utilitarian argument, developed by the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham in his Fragments 
on government (1776) and Principles of morals and legislation (1789) that man as a rational, self-
interested being knows what is in their own best interest . This means that as a rational actor the 35
individual determines what is in their best interests and what actions to pursue to create an im-
provement in general well-being and happiness. In the classical liberal theory of the state this is ex-
trapolated from the individual to society as a whole utilising the idea that a collection of individuals 
know what is best for them compared with state action to intervene . This can be traced back to the 36
father of modern economics, Adam Smith who explained value in terms of the division of labour 
and the cost of materials in his seminal book the Wealth of Nations (1776). Smith’s argument, which 
many subsequent British political economists, philosophers and economists expanded and devel-
oped, the factors of production is where the value of the product comes, based purely in the rational 
nature of commerce and the argument of the ‘economic man’. Smith writes that individual self-in-
terest guides the actions of human beings within a market place. Smith sees the economy as a series 
of relationships operating in a market place generating a voluntary, contractual arrangement be-
tween consumers and producers, workers and employees which operates in accordance with the 
self-interest of individuals, creating an ‘economic man’ who operates out of self-interest . In the 37
often quoted passage from the Wealth of Nations (1776), Smith states that ‘It is not from the benev-
olence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to 
their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk 
to them of our own necessities but of their advantages’ . Indeed, Norman Barry notes that the ideal 38
state of political economics in Austrian model would be the Rechtsstaat: a state governed and con-
strained by the rule of law meaning the state would be limited to the functions of a classical eco-
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nomic “night-watchmen” role . This is the similarity between both intellectual schools. Hayek 39
wrote extensively during his time at the LSE during the late 1930s about the role of classical liberal-
ism and the state marrying the two positions in his Road to Serfdom, published still whilst at the 
LSE in 1944. 
  The combination of Robbins and Hayek at the LSE made a formidable intellectual partner-
ship, with Robbins and Hayek complementing each other’s intellectual arguments. Robbins, in his 
1971 autobiography, wrote that “Both in terms of intellectual companionship and academic collabo-
ration I should find it difficult to overstate the stimulus and help which I derived from this relation-
ship” . Hayek was equally complementary about Robbins, stating that “We were really a circle of 40
close personal friends who got on well together… I could never have had the influence I did if it 
hadn’t have been for Robbins” . This was what was so crucial to the revival of classical liberal 41
economic thought in Britain, both Hayek and Robbins were intellectual kindred spirits, who be-
lieved in market solutions to the crisis and both understood the arguments of the Austrian school. 
Indeed, as Cockett notes, Robbins’ appreciation of the Austrian school went further than an under-
standing but unlike most of his contemporaries a belief that the Austrian argument was truly ‘mod-
ern economics’ unlike Keynes’ revolutionary ideas .  42
 It is perhaps unsurprising that Hayek and Robbins worked well together at the LSE given 
both their intellectual outlooks and the influence of the Austrian School on their thinking. Indeed, 
the partnership of Hayek and Robbins within the LSE caused concern amongst fellow staff. Bev-
eridge writes that “[Harold] Laski denounces Robbins and his group of fanatical individualists for 
their resolute refusal to study the economic facts of today or permit any deviation from abstract rea-
soning on disputed premises” . The future Labour chancellor Hugh Dalton and LSE academic re43 -
marked retrospectively many years after he’d sponsored Robbins to the chairmanship that Robbins 
allowed variety in the economics department to disappear and instead be replaced by “a much more 
uniformed brand of right-wing economics” . With contemporaries noticing the change in direction 44
of the department and the profound mutual respect between Hayek and Robbins helped to develop 
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this cluster of like-minded individuals around the LSE buildings in Houghton Street who would 
form the intellectual opposition to the advance of Keynesianism during the mid-to-late 1930s. 
 Once in Britain, Hayek wasted no time in tackling Keynes’ theories. Hayek, first, went to 
Cambridge to deliver a talk to Keynes’ followers at the Marshall society, which was met with si-
lence following Hayek’s talk rather than the spirited debate which usually greeted speakers to the 
society. The main argument Hayek proposed, contra Keynes, was that there is no link between ag-
gregate demand and unemployment, which to the economists gathered was completely different to 
the arguments Keynes had proposed and would later expand on . Joan Robinson, who attended this 45
lecture, described Hayek’s first performance in Britain as a “pitiful state of confusion” . Hayek 46
then went to the LSE to deliver a series of lectures which attacked Keynes’ arguments. Indeed, 
Wapshott states that lectures provided the assembled LSE students and lecturers the first proper as-
sault on Keynes’s arguments. Wapshott writes “Here at last was a cogent, convincing repudiation of 
Keynesian interventionist notions. Hayek showed that the remedies coming from Cambridge, which 
appeared so plausible, were riddle with logical flaws” . Robbins, who had invited Hayek to deliver 47
the lectures, was delighted. In his autobiography, Robbins writes the lectures were a success “partly 
for their revelations of an aspect of classical monetary theory which for many years had been for-
gotten” . Following the lectures and vote for Hayek to take the Tooke Chair, Hayek produced a 48
scathing review of Keynes’ newly published Treatise on Money in the LSE’s Economica journal, 
with the encouragement of Robbins . This was published after the series of lectures delivered by 49
Hayek at the LSE in which Hayek laid down the groundwork for his opposition to Keynes’ theories 
regarding aggregate demand. Indeed, so ill-tempered was Hayek’s review it led Keynes to complain 
that Hayek had “not read his book with an open mind that the author expects of a reader” . This 50
review sparked what become known as the LSE/Cambridge debates, which continued both in print 
and verbally for much of the early 1930s.   
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 Hayek’s initial review of Keynes’ Treatise on Money was scathing , Hayek starts of by cri51 -
tique Keynes’ adherence to Alfred Marshall, suggesting he is trapped in his thinking and thus blink-
ered to any other viewpoint. He continues to attack Keynes on this point, saying that Keynes had 
misinterpreted Austrian school economics, pointing frequently to Keynes’s definition regarding sav-
ings and investments and his ignoring of the Austrian theory of capital . Essentially, Hayek was 52
critiquing Keynes’s belief that savings and investments did not need to be in equilibrium, which 
was the cornerstone of his ideas on aggregate demand and its use in alleviating the financial crisis. 
Hayek, further attack Keynes on the complexity of his argument stating that “so highly technical 
and complicated that it must forever remain entirely unintelligible to those who are not experts” . 53
Hayek was implying that Keynes’s theories may sound plausible to those not trained in economics 
but to the expert are full of intellectual errors.  This debate would continue for the next three years, 
but Keynes immediately responded to Hayek’s initial criticism in Economica in the November edi-
tion. Indeed, Keynes’ response to Hayek’s critique is equally hostile. Keynes addresses Hayek’s 
criticism regarding his theory of capital but immediately points out that Hayek has failed to state 
what Keynes’ conclusions are. This then follows into a lengthy explanation of Keynes’ capital theo-
ry, correcting Hayek at numerous points in his assertions whilst expanding on his own argument for 
increasing aggregate demand . Keynes digresses quite purposefully into a critique of Hayek’s new54 -
ly published Prices and Production, based on the lectures given at the LSE in the summer. Keynes 
writes:   
“The book, as it stands, seems to me to be one of the most frightful muddles I have ever 
read, with scarcely a sound proposition in it beginning with page 45, and yet it remains a 
book of some interest, which is likely to leave its mark on the mind of the reader. It is an 
extraordinary example of how, starting with a mistake, a remorseless logician can end up in 
Bedlam” . 55
Keynes’s retort, as one can see, was as equally ill-tempered as Hayek’s initial article. Indeed, 
Hayek’s response to Keynes’ response was published in the same edition of Economica highlighting 
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the strength of feeling in this debate between the two different interpretations on how the economy 
works in theory and in practice . As this debate progressed, the two continued the debate both in 56
the pages of Economica and through private correspondence. Indeed, in 1932, Keynes asked one of 
his disciples, Piero Sraffa, to continue with the debate which was no less ill-tempered and often 
highly technical .  57
 A second strand of these debates revolved around the level of intervention within the econ-
omy. As Keynes moved towards the publication of his General Theory on Employment, Interest and 
Money in 1936, much of which had been discussed in the LSE/Cambridge debates, the idea of eco-
nomics in terms of the whole economy was something Hayek rejected.  The debate focused primari-
ly around the extent to which government should interfere in the economic crisis through public 
works and government expenditure and often involved some highly technical discussions critiquing 
each other’s methodological assumptions and prejudices on what was the cause of the present crisis. 
The importance of these debates, as well as the two men who conducted them cannot be overstated 
in importance. Although Keynesianism was not quite mainstream amongst the political class, except 
in his own Liberal Party, his ideas were gaining traction amongst intellectuals, the media and West-
minster. Keynes served on numerous committees, such has the Economic Advisory Council - which 
continued after the fall of MacDonald’s Labour government, as well as the Macmillan Committee 
on Banking and Finance . Keynes’ theories, although still dismissed by the Treasury were gaining 58
ground. Hayek, on the other hand, was defending the classical liberal orthodoxy which had by the 
early 1930s seemed to run its course. Cockett notes that many saw Keynes’s ideas as the future 
from across the academic and political world, whereas, the economics proposed by Hayek and 
Robbins at the LSE was almost reactionary . Indeed, given the widespread mass unemployment 59
during the early years of the depression, the political message behind adherents of classical liberal 
economics seemed to a wider audience as do nothing and wait for the market to return to equilibri-
um. This possibly would explain the success of Keynesianism in the 1930s, Richard Cockett notes 
that unlike Hayek and Robbins, who operated on conviction, Keynes was flexible and always 
looked for the ‘politically possible’ solution often to gain consensus .  60
 F.A Hayek, Prof Hayek’s response to Prof Keynes. Economica, (Nov 1931)56
 Wapshott, Keynes Hayek,121. 57
 Susan Howson and Donald Winch, Economic Advisory Council 1930 - 1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 58
Press, 1977), Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes - The Economist as Saviour 1920 - 1937: a biography (London, 
Macmillan, 1992) 
 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 5359
 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 5360
!21
 It is in this context that British neoliberalism starts to develop out of the older ideas of eco-
nomic management. Keynes’ new theories attracted many followers across the political divide, in-
cluding Conservatives such as future Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who famously called for a 
mixed economy in his 1938 work The Middle Way . Keynes’ theory offered a bold alternative to 61
the argument that the economy will right itself which many in the treasury and the National Gov-
ernment believed in the early 1930s. Indeed, on an international level, classical economics, which 
Hayek to an extent represented was on the retreat in the 1930s. In the United States, under the De-
mocratic President Franklin. D Roosevelt, huge increases in public spending were agreed to by 
Congress to finance public works schemes to get unemployed Americans back to work in his fa-
mous New Deal . In Nazi Germany, under Adolf Hitler, the same process was taking place with 62
huge sums of public money being spent on the construction of public works and rearmament. 
Hayek, conversely was defending an orthodoxy which to many in positions of power was increas-
ingly impotent. Indeed, Keith Tribe, dismisses Hayek’s argument as ahistorical harking to a time 
which only existed in the mid-nineteenth century and did not even survive the fin de siècle . How63 -
ever, although Hayek was seeming to defend an older idea of economic management, the point 
about the success of this defence is not in dispute, Keynesianism by the eve of the Second World 
War was winning the argument. However, Hayek was re-affirming an older commitment regarding 
the dangers of an over-reaching state, which first develops in the LSE/ Cambridge debates and then 
further in The Road to Serfdom. Indeed, the greatest success of the LSE/Cambridge debates would 
be realised not in the short term but in the long durée of the intellectual development of neoliberal-
ism in Britain. The ideas which Hayek argued in his rebuttals of Keynes were taking hold at the 
LSE, just as Keynes’s ideas had in Cambridge. Hayek at the LSE “reinforced the economic liberal 
tradition of the school, and his British colleagues learnt much from the Austrian School, which re-
fined and buttressed their own liberal positions” . That reinforcement of classical economics, rep64 -
resented by the LSE/Cambridge debates, is ultimately the start of the process of this rebirth of clas-
sical liberal ideas on the economy which would be central to the development of neoliberalism in 
Britain.  
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 However, it was not only Hayek who was the main force behind this development of the the 
LSE into a centre of economic liberalism. Robbins himself devoted a considerable amount of per-
sonal effort in counteracting the prevailing trend towards economic intervention. Robbins appeared 
on a number of BBC programmes defending the ideas of economic liberalism during the period and 
was involved in the same committee as Keynes, the Economic Advisory Council. However, the best 
expression of Robbins’ views come from his 1934 work The Great Depression, in which Robbins 
restated the classical position that the market would correct itself without interference and that the 
policies of government were hindering the recovery by attempting reflationary policies thus failing 
to correct wages which therefore helped to maintain the high levels of unemployment . Indeed, on 65
the genesis of the depression, Robbins points to the expansion of credit in the United States caused 
by Federal Reserve pushing the market into disequilibrium as the money supply outstripped sav-
ings. In a somewhat charged statement, Robbins infers that “It was not old-fashioned practice but 
new fashioned theory which was responsible for the excesses of the American disaster.” . Indeed, 66
Robbins’ objection to government interference goes much further, in a telling paragraph, Robbins 
states “But "planning"— ah! magic word — who would not plan? We may not all be socialists now, 
but we are certainly (nearly) all planners. Yet, if planning is not a polite name for giving sectional 
advantages to particular industries, what does it denote but socialism—central control of the means 
of production?” . For Robbins, the planning advocated during the 1930s is to grant sectional ad67 -
vantage, in effect a monopolistic position to certain industries but it is sanctioned by the state. In-
deed, Robbins devotes an substantial section of his work discussing monopolies. He states clearly 
that “Industrial monopoly, where it does not depend upon natural monopoly, is usually the by-prod-
uct of Protection or a system of trademarks and patent legislation definitely inimical to 
competition.” . Robbins like Hayek, as we will see later in this thesis, is concerned about the 68
growth of monopoly which in classical economics is always to the detriment of society, as it distorts 
the market allowing a disequilibrium to exist. Indeed, Adam Smith first articulated the issue in the 
Wealth of Nations, in his discussions of mercantilism that when a duty or prohibition is placed on 
import, it conversely creates a monopoly in the domestic market . Smith notes whilst this may ben69 -
efit the monopoly-holders, the examples which he cites are corn-growers, cattle rearers ect, it nega-
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tively effects consumers in the form of inflated prices. Robbins is citing a concern which was highly 
prevalent in British classical economics, the distortion of the market through state interference by 
trying to protect industry have created monopolies, in the form of protected industries focused on 
sectional interests.  
 Furthermore, as well as his concerns about industrial monopoly, Robbins examines the issue 
of free trade and calls for its restoration. Free trade is a concept in British classical economics, in 
which the argument was that goods and services should be allowed to cross borders with minimal 
customs duties (tariffs) or restrictions (quotas). Indeed, free trade was one of the cornerstone of 
classical liberalism in the British context. Free trade originated from the ideas of Adam Smith, who 
argued against the mercantilist system as mutual trade between nations would be beneficial to both. 
In the Wealth of Nations, Smith argued that "If a foreign country can supply us with a commodity 
cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our 
own industry employed in a way in which we have some advantage. The general industry of the 
country, being always in proportion to the capital which employs it, will not thereby be 
diminished ... but only left to find out the way in which it can be employed with the greatest advan-
tage.” . This was later expanded by the British political economist David Ricardo, in his Principles 70
of Political Economy (1817)  who like Smith advocated free trade but called the system compara71 -
tive advantage, whereby one country, in his example Portugal has an absolute advantage in wine 
manufacture over Britain, because of climate, topography ect, but Britain has a comparative advan-
tage in the production of cloth, which Portugal can make but at a greater cost; as such it is mutually 
beneficial for Britain and Portugal to trade this comparative advantage. It was this reasoning which 
became the basis for economic thinking in nineteenth century Britain. However, Britain did at the 
time still have relatively high protective tariffs, particularly on grain. This is when free trade mi-
grated from a point of academic enquiry to political issue. In 1820, Thomas Tooke organised a peti-
tion by merchants calling for the abolition of the Corn Laws and the introduction of free trade, this 
was subsequently blocked by the administration of Lord Liverpool. In the meantime, the rural 
landowning class, who would have the most to lose from repeal galvanised behind the Tory Party. 
Conversely, the urban merchants and workers supported the Whig party. By the 1840s, the debate 
was still going on, two radicals, Richard Cobden and Joseph Bright, argued for greater economic 
prosperity, the market like the individual should be free by founding the Anti-Corn Law League in 
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1838 to specifically campaign against the high tariffs designed to protect domestic producers. Cob-
den argued that by liberating trade between nations that general prosperity and wellbeing would 
improve. Cobden remarked during the campaign to repeal the Corn Laws that only the Corn Laws 
stood in the way of four general improvements in Britain: 
“First, it would guarantee the prosperity of the manufacturer by affording him outlets for 
his products. Second, it would relieve the 'condition of England question' by cheapening the 
price of food and ensuring more regular employment. Third, it would make English agricul-
ture more efficient by stimulating demand for its products in urban and industrial areas. 
Fourth, it would introduce through mutually advantageous international trade a new era of 
international fellowship and peace. The only barrier to these four beneficent solutions was 
the ignorant self-interest of the landlords, the 'bread-taxing oligarchy, unprincipled, unfeel-
ing, rapacious and plundering.”  7273
To Cobden and his later supporters, like Lionel Robbins, free trade came to symbolise liberal prin-
ciples in practice. The economy, when free, could provide people with a better standard of living, 
employment and prosperity as opposed to the vested interest of tariffs and subsidy. As a committed 
free trader, Robbins believes that the most efficient form of management of trade policy is free 
trade, as it maximises and raises the real incomes based on a system of competition between states. 
Robbins notes quite succinctly that “The ideal trade policy of a State planned to raise to a maximum 
the real incomes of its members in all these formal respects would exactly resemble the trade policy 
of economic liberalism.” . Robbins is utilising the ideas of Smith, as well as Cobden and Bright by 74
drawing the link between prosperity and free trade which was one of the cornerstone of political 
classical liberalism in Britain.  
 However, Robbins goes on to highlight that the erection of tariff barriers is already under-
way, and that in a world of planned economies, economic nationalism would form regional groups 
eliminating competition leading to the determent of the individual. Indeed, Robbins’ vision, whilst 
somewhat over-exaggerated was partially based on the fear that the liberal economic order in terms 
of globalised trade was being eroded, as steadily throughout the 1930s, governments responding to 
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the economic crash resorted to protectionism in the form of tariff. Robbins wrote that “A world in 
which the movement of goods, of money and of people, is restrained and impeded by national or-
ganisation is a world in which the achievement of the international ideal, whether on Socialist or 
Liberal lines, is more distant even than it is at present.” .  Robbins is envisaging a world in which 75
economic nationalism, another concern of the early neoliberal movement in Britain, has hindered 
the free exchange of goods, capital and even labour across borders. Indeed, this liberalisation of 
trade would become one of the ideas closely associated with neoliberalism, not just in Britain but 
globally, but this idea was born out of the British classical liberal tradition which Robbins defends 
in the Great Depression.  
 Robbins’ work sold well and was reviewed in a good light even by those who disagreed with 
him. Howson notes that several reviewers noted hints to Hayek’s trade cycle, however, Robbins re-
sponded that his argument was not particular Austrian, having been first discussed by the English 
economist D.H Robertson . Indeed, Robbins central point in the Great Depression is exactly what 76
would be come a trait of British neoliberalism in the post-war era and in Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, 
that planning and intervention always leads to distortion and unintended consequences. Indeed, Kei-
th Tribe points out that Arnold Plant had devised a similar arguments during the 1920s, drawing on 
the economic principles he had learned from Edwin Canaan, regarding racial discrimination in the 
American South and South Africa, as poor whites sought to disadvantage blacks though political 
means to extract a form of rent .  Throughout the 1930s, Robbins and Hayek would continue to 77
stress the importance of classical economics, with Hayek engaged in the LSE/Cambridge debates 
and Robbins conducting his own rebuttals, the two men were vocal critiques of planning and state 
intervention. 
 The arrival of Hayek in Britain, Robbins being appointed chair of the Economics Depart-
ment and the start of the LSE/Cambridge debates all contributed to the intellectual development of 
neoliberalism in Britain. This was the most important result of these three separate events combined 
to assist in creating the academic powerhouse for the development of neoliberalism in Britain. Un-
der Robbins leadership, the economics department of the LSE became the primary intellectual insti-
tution for classical liberal economic thought within Europe. As Cockett notes “The relationship be-
tween Hayek and Robbins was to become crucial to the development of a school of economic liber-
alism in Britain during the 1930s and 1940s, just as their works was to make its economic depart-
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ment the outstanding centre for economic liberalism in Europe” . Tribe notes that “LSE economists 78
stood out for clarity with which they linked the economics they taught to liberal ideas” . This cen79 -
tre of economic liberalism was crucial to the development of neoliberalism as these ideas could 
have been lost in Britain if not for the formidable partnership of Hayek and Robbins. With Keyne-
sianism become increasingly popular, especially after the publishing of the General Theory, the 
LSE stood out against the growing calls for ‘collectivisation’ and economic planning. It was this 
opposition to planning which gave the early neoliberal theorists their great cause for concern which 
would be continued throughout the period, advocating non-state solutions to economic manage-
ment. 
 The primary result of this ‘centre’ of economic liberalism was the influence of its teaching 
on future undergraduates and countering Keynes’ increasingly popular narrative. This new genera-
tion of undergraduates at the LSE would not only be influenced by the teaching of Hayek and Rob-
bins but also by other influential classical economists such as Sir Arnold Plant, who specialised in 
business administration at the LSE . One such undergraduate whom this thesis will examine at fur80 -
ther points is Arthur Seldon, the future editorial director of the Institute of Economic Affairs. Sel-
don, born Arthur Slaberdian, was born in humble beginnings to Jewish parents in London’s East 
End. This profoundly affected the young Arthur, in his early years, he recalled cheering the Labour 
candidate aged 8 and was interested in the ideas of socialism , but by his late teens became a com81 -
mitted classical liberals. Indeed at sixth-form, before he joined the LSE, Seldon wrote an essay on 
Laissez-Faire v. Economic Planning, he remarks that ‘I believe laissez-faire is still the best policy 
for the world and that State planning with prices and interference in any industry but natural mo-
nopolies… must lead to chaotic results’ . Seldon continues with his attack on socialism’s outlook, 82
he wrote: 
  
“I find now that my opinions were based on sentiment and snobbishness - on the observa-
tion of the conditions under which some of the less fortunate members of society lived. The 
study of economics has not only exposed the fallacy of the absurd opinions which I once 
 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 2578
 Tribe, Liberalism and Neoliberalism in Britain, 7879
 Tribe, Liberalism and Neoliberalism in Britain, 7880
Arthur Seldon, The Collected Works of Arthur Seldon, vol. 1 p.85 [2004]81
 Arthur Seldon quoted in Colin Robinson, Arthur Seldon (London: Profile Books, 2009) 1782
!27
held, but has even prejudiced me against my former political friends. The study of eco-
nomics has been the cause of my moving to the Right. Will I change again? I wonder…”  83
Arthur Seldon joined the London School of Economics in 1934 and immediately became involved 
in the life of the department. Under the tutelage of Robbins, Hayek and Plant, Seldon excelled at the 
LSE, gaining a first class degree in economics. Seldon would write in later life about the debt which 
he owed the LSE economics department. Seldon returned to the LSE for his postgraduate degree 
and later worked as a research assistant to Arnold Plant and it was this education which laid the 
groundwork for Seldon’s later career as the editorial director of the most influential think-tank of 
the 1970s, the Institute for Economic Affairs. Seldon, when he spoke of the LSE said “I graduated 
by National Insurance and state education to the LSE. There I read voraciously Lenin, Laski, Stra-
chey, Dalton but was more influenced by Robbins, Plant and Hayek” . This was the strength of the 84
LSE during the 1930s, producing undergraduates who would become sympathetic and oppose the 
prevailing Keynesian doctrine and the subsequent democratic socialist policies of the Attlee admin-
istration after the Second World War. As more and more opinion-setters such as politicians, the me-
dia and academia were turning increasingly towards interventionist solutions to the economic crisis 
of the 1930s, the LSE stood as a centre of classical economic liberalism in its teaching and academ-
ic output which was developed consciously by Robbins and assisted by Hayek. This teaching and 
academic programme would prove invaluable to the development of British neoliberalism and its 
institutions in the post-war era.  
II 
The second institution which assisted in developing the neoliberalism in Britain was the Liberal 
Party, however, the party was a shadow of its former strength during the early decades of the twen-
tieth century. The party left power in 1922 following the Conservatives abandoning the coalition 
with Lloyd-George which had governed following the Great War. By 1929, the three main parties, 
The Conservatives, led by Stanley Baldwin, Labour, led by Ramsey MacDonald, and the Liberal 
Party led by David Lloyd George all had very different ideas on how the country and the economy 
should be run. The Conservatives, the incumbent government, ran on the policy of ‘Safety First’ 
essentially accepting the economic orthodoxy of the post-Great War world and continuing with sim-
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ilar policies which had come before. The Labour Party ran on a platform of social democracy: better 
welfare payments, assistance for the unemployed, state intervention in industry following the broad 
ideas of democratic socialism. The Liberal Party, however, ran with a new type of economic theory 
proposed by the Liberal economist John Maynard Keynes titled “We can conquer Unemployment”. 
Keynes’s theories, and now Liberal Party proposals, argued for increase public expenditure to fi-
nance public works to create employment. This would then reduce the burden on the state welfare 
budget, increase employment and generate a fiscal stimulus for the economy. The Liberal proposals 
were by far the most radical offered to the electorate in 1929 and highlighted a wealth of talent 
which the Liberal Party hoped to showcase with “We can conquer Unemployment”. Indeed, the of-
ficial Treasury copy of “We can conquer unemployment” had written on the cover “Extravagance. 
Inflation. Bankruptcy” . However, despite the three very different ideas of economic management 85
on display, no party won an overall majority. The Labour party took the most seats and formed a 
minority government, with a confidence and supply arrangement with the Liberal Party .  86
 This situation became radically different following the Wall Street Crash in October 1929, 
and the subsequent crash in the European banking system, starting with collapse of CreditAnsalt in 
Austria in 1931. By the summer of 1931, the economic situation overwhelmed the Labour govern-
ment, financiers in the City of London were withdrawing huge quantities of Gold - as Britain had 
returned to the Gold Standard in 1925 - meaning that the value of the pound was overinflated and 
did not match the gold price. In one month, the UK lost 25 per cent of its gold reserves. MacDon-
ald’s government was informed by the Governor of the Bank of England that the only solution to 
ease the market pressure was to reduce government expenditure particularly unemployment benefit. 
The cabinet was split 11 to 10 and MacDonald resigned as Prime Minister, as he no longer carried 
the support of his party. However, King George V requested MacDonald form a coalition of nation-
al unity to sort out the economic crisis. MacDonald formed a coalition with the Conservatives, Lib-
erals and a rump of Labour. However, Liberal Party did not enter the 1931 election as a united party. 
Firstly, many Liberals were concerned over the Conservative Party’s support for protectionism, and 
as such campaigning under the National Government banner seemed to the historic defenders of 
free trade an anathema. The party managed to gain a concession that it would stand on the National 
ticket but on a separate manifesto committed to free trade, the Liberal Party subsequently left the 
National Government in 1932 over the issue. The second, more important issue was a split which 
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had begun to emerge within the liberal ranks. The Samuelite Liberals, who were the bulk of Liberal 
MPs and the official Liberal party, led by the party leader Herbert Samuel, were committed to free 
trade but agreed to join the coalition. The Lloyd George liberals, mostly from his family grouping 
and centred around North Wales, opposed coalition and stood separate from the National Govern-
ment in opposition. The final grouping led by Sir John Simon, supported tariffs in extremis and de-
cided to break away under the Liberal National banner, formalised into the Liberal National Party 
and join the Conservative benches from 1931 . This meant that by 1932 the Liberal Party was in 87
weakened state racked by divisions within its own ranks, and when the Samuelite liberals left the 
National Government over tariffs, the Liberal National MPs did not rejoin their colleagues and in-
stead stayed in government with the Conservatives. The National Government went to the polls to 
request a “doctor’s mandate”- to do what is necessary to fix the economy and subsequently received 
the largest mandate in parliamentary history with 554 seats in the House of Commons.  
 The Ownership for All committee was called following the Liberal Party’s further decline at 
the 1935 election. The new leader Archibald Sinclair was more sympathetic to the ideas of Dodds, 
and used the rhetorical flourish ‘ownership for all’ in a number of speeches but the detail of what 
this meant was left to the Ownership for All committee. The committee was formed under Dodds’ 
initiative by proposing a motion at the 1937 Liberal Conference in Buxton regarding property dis-
tribution and called for the formation of a special committee to look further at the issue . The 88
committee, chaired by Elliott Dodds himself was predominantly staffed by Liberal activists who 
had practical rather than academic expertise . However, this did not mean that the committee did 89
not have any academic expertise. The London School of Economics contributed significantly to the 
input provided to the committee. Lionel Robbins corresponded with Dodds during the writing of the 
committee’s report providing practical advice for policy suggestions. Indeed, Susan Howson notes 
that in December 1937, Robbins attended a weekend meeting of the committee regarding agricul-
tural land ownership, which provided a considerable amount of evidence for the committee . In 90
addition to his appearance at the Ownership for All committee, Robbins also corresponded with El-
liott Dodds on numerous other policy issues which the Ownership for All committee examined. In-
deed, one such letter dated the 28th of October 1937, Robbins provided a paper by Chicago econ-
omist Henry Simons, as well as discussing profit sharing. Peter Sloman speculates that this was Si-
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mons Positive Case for Laissez Faire (Chicago, 1934) but either way Dodds found the work ‘a 
tremendous lot of use’ . In addition to Robbins, the young Arthur Seldon, a recent LSE graduate 91
and member of the LSE Liberal Club served as the committee’s paid secretary with the responsibili-
ty of drafting the committee’s reports, including the final report . Arnold Plant, Seldon’s mentor at 92
the LSE, also advised the committee but chose not to be named . This shows not only the intercon93 -
nected nature of intellectual collaboration during this period between political parties and academic 
economics but also the link between the London School of Economics and the Liberal Party in the 
formation of British neoliberalism, with Robbins, Dodds and Seldon all interacting on this one party 
committee in 1937.   
 The committee which assembled would produce a document which was radically different 
to the Yellow Book written in 1929 and the subsequent election campaigned fought by the Liberal 
Party. The document mounted a systematic defence of British classical liberal doctrine and was de-
signed to create a distinctive liberal alternative to socialist interventionism. The sixty-six-page re-
port contained a significant amount of policy but what was more important is the ideas and state-
ments behind simply policy announcements. In the abridged version of the report, the committee 
outline what the purpose of property is in society.  The committee write that “Property is something 
“proper” to a man. It enables him to live his own life and develop his own individuality. The man 
who possesses “a bit of property” has something to fall back on in bad times, and is not compelled 
to take the first job that offers.”  This argument is based on the British classical liberal ideas about 94
property being the safeguard of civil society. The argument is that property is the guarantor of the 
individual, by noting that the owners of property have an insurance against poverty as they have 
something to utilise in times of strife. The report goes further stating that property has a role in 
guaranteeing that a person’s individualism is maintained. The report states that the individual “(He) 
can think freely, act freely, vote freely, without fear of the consequences. He is neither a cog in the 
industrial machine nor a pawn on the political chess-board. He is his own master.”  This directly 95
links the idea of private property, and property in general, to a wider point about the Liberal world 
view. Property is the guarantee that the individual cannot be harassed or control as they are in 
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charge of their own lives through property. The committee goes on to point out that those without 
property are at risk stating “Conversely, the concentration of ownership in the hands either of a 
small class or of the State denies the ordinary man his right to be a man and makes him a slave, not 
a citizen” . This idea that property is the guarantor of freedom for the individual is a theme which 96
is present throughout the document. Indeed, the committee goes much further than simply restating 
the classical liberal idea that property is important, the Ownership for All committee goes on to 
point out the political situation in continental Europe to highlight the problem with societies with 
large numbers of dispossessed people. The committee writes that only “The widespread ownership 
of property is the firmest guarantee against dictatorship. A large propertyless class forms a standing 
menace to democracy, for the multitude of dispossessed offer a ready prey to the demagogue and 
the dictator, while the small class which owns is prone to turn to fascism in fear of losing its posses-
sions.” . This idea that only with property ownership can demagoguery and dictatorship be stopped 97
highlights the Liberal fears of their own time with an increasing number of countries turning to the 
ideas of fascism and communism. The report states that; “The revolutions on the continent provide 
proof of this. In Russia the peasants had “nothing to lose but their chains”. In Italy and Germany the 
middle classes were nearly ruined, and the condition of the working-classes was pitiable. It was this 
that gave the dictators their chance, for nations in such a plight are ripe to barter liberty for liveli-
hoods” .  98
 This statement is interesting because of the context of the time, the Bolshevik Revolution of 
1917 and Fascism and Nazism rise in Italy and Germany respectively had created competing sys-
tems to generate prosperity which were in opposition to the liberal world view of individualism and 
property-ownership. This point mattered to the Liberal activists serving on this committee. If conti-
nental Europe could fall to dictatorship, then without radical redress Great Britain could go the 
same way. Contextually, in Britain, approximately 40,000 people were members of the British 
Union of Fascists, founded by Sir Oswald Mosley, in 1932  and the owner of the Daily Mail, Lord 99
Rothermere ran the headline ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts’ .  On the other side of the political spec100 -
trum, the Communist Party of Great Britain managed to get a member of parliament elected in the 
 Ownership for All, 296
 Ownership for All, 397
 Ownership for All, 398
 Andrzej Olechnowicz, "Liberal Anti-Fascism in the 1930s: The Case of Sir Ernest Barker" in Albion: A Quarterly 99
Journal Concerned with British Studies, (Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter, 2004), p. 643.
 Lord Rothermere, ‘Hurrah for the Blackshirts’, Daily Mail (January 15, 1934)100
!32
1935 election and strike agitation increased significantly. Indeed, even with stories of brutality 
emerging from the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin, British socialists such as Beatrice and Sidney 
Webb (now Lord Passfield) praised Stalin’s Russia as a worker’s utopia in their book Soviet Com-
munism: A New Civilisation? (1935) . Richard Overy, in his work The Morbid Age, notes that dur101 -
ing the interwar years ‘the notion that capitalism was in a state of physical, possibly fatal decay be-
came embedded in the popular perception of the economic system’ . Liberalism, conversely, to 102
the dynamic forces of communism and state corporatism was seen as a dying ideology. In 1935, 
George Dangerfield wrote his The Strange Death of Liberal England which stated that the Liberal 
Party had died before the First World War. Although largely discredited now, when published the 
thesis was widely read. In addition, given the internal divisions in the Liberal Party during the 
1920s between Asquith and Lloyd George, and the subsequent split in 1931 between the Liberal 
Nationals, led by Sir John Simon, and the main Liberal Party of Herbert Samuel, the party struggled 
with unity and discipline. This situation became more heightened after 1929, when more people be-
came unemployed particularly in Northern England, South Wales and Scotland. The 1930s became 
as A.J.P Taylor described the ‘devil’s decade’  characterised by mass unemployment, hunger 103
marches, declining industry and poverty which became the hallmarks of the decade for much of 
Britain’s urban working class and unemployed. In 1932, over 3 million were unemployed with un-
employment in many of the traditional staple industries - coal-mining, shipbuilding, textiles and 
steel manufacture - could run in excess of 25 per cent of the workforce . Indeed, the often-quoted 104
northern shipbuilding town of Jarrow, nearly 70 per cent of the workforce was unemployed by 1935 
when the town’s major employer Palmers Shipyard closed . Unemployment was not just confined 105
to the depression years of the 1930s, as since the end of the Great War in 1918, unemployment in 
Britain never dropped below 10 per cent of the working-age population . 106
 It was this situation that the Liberals serving on the Ownership for All committee sought to 
address. With unemployment so high and most of the country not owning property, the plan of the 
Ownership for All committee was to address this imbalance to prevent the slide towards totalitarian-
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ism. The committee writes that “Where the mass of citizens, on the other hand, possess a stake in 
their country, the basis of society, being just, will be stable; the habit of independence will in gener-
al, and dictatorship will not be tolerated. A real democracy can only be made of “free men with 
vested rights in their own living” (Walter Lippmann, The Method of Freedom, p.112)” . This last 107
statement on the importance of a property owning democracy in reference to an individual's stake in 
society is highly important. The two sections discussing the broad outlines of the committee’s work 
relate directly to the importance of property to classical liberal ideology. This statement of philo-
sophical guidance at the beginning of the Ownership for All committee’s report highlights the influ-
ence of British classical liberalism in forming British neoliberalism. The idea of property as the 
guarantor of a society’s freedom is derived from the seventeenth century philosopher John Locke 
and his Two Treatise on Government (1690) . Locke argued that the original state of man was 108
based upon subsistence. The individual cultivates the land, builds shelter and lives a subsistence-
based life. As mankind developed, communities formed, however, despite the original state of man 
being based on subsistence that does not stop another individual from trying to dispossess you of 
your property through war, conquest or theft. Locke’s thoughts on property extends to both physical 
property and an individual’s labour stating that “every Man has a Property in his own Person. This 
no body has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may 
say, are properly his.” . Locke’s basic argument is that as man became more developed, mankind 109
then began to organise into communities; to administer the relationships between individuals the 
State formed providing societal structures underpinned by the rule of law and private property. For 
Locke, the ideal state is where individuals give tacit consent for government to exist and that the 
government’s role is the preservation of private property, defence of the realm and administration of 
law . Locke’s system is based on the rationalism of the individual that they will abided by the sys110 -
tem writing "The freedom [then] of Man and liberty of acting according to his own will is grounded 
on his having reason, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by, and make 
it know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will" . He goes on to say without the rule of 111
law and freeing man from the rule of law would actual cause harm to the individual as they would 
have no defence for their property which civil society provides once the post subsistence advance-
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ment has been reached . Similar to the thoughts of some Austrian school economists such as Von 112
Mises, Locke’s assertion that private property is a natural right to be earned is at the bedrock of his 
vision for society. The Ownership for All committee therefore continues this tradition of seeing pri-
vate property as the cornerstone for a free society which was a significant aspect of British classical 
liberalism.  
 Once the philosophical premise of the Ownership for All committee was established, the 
committee went on to propose several solutions to alleviate the economic problems of mid-twenti-
eth century Britain. The committee produced sections on inheritance and landed wealth, however, 
one section which a significant proportion of the document was dedicated to is monopolies. The 
committee expresses their displeasure with the system of monopolies which exist in Britain, some 
of which were government mandated . Although, the committee does accept that in certain cir113 -
cumstances natural monopolies, monopolies which form naturally because competition within that 
market would likely to lead to inefficiency and duplication of resources, exist such as in the case of 
gas and electricity distribution and production, it is essential that this should be mixed with private 
enterprise where possible . Although this does sound like significant intervention, which subse114 -
quent post-war neoliberals such as Milton Friedman and Hayek would decry, at this time this was 
considered a sensible policy. Indeed, in the Road to Serfdom published less than a decade after this 
report, Hayek is not opposed to the welfarism advocated by Beveridge or Keynes, so long as checks 
and balances are provided in the system. Indeed, the committee does state in the succeeding para-
graphs that “It should be borne in mind, however, that control tends to spread easily from one in-
dustry to another, that it may involve serious abuses in other spheres and that it may create more 
evils than it cures.”  Meaning that all this intervention must be done gradually and with restraint.  115
 This attack on monopolies forms the basis of what the Liberal Party would do specifically to 
alleviate the crisis. The committee attacks the “official Monopolies” designated by the state such as 
the Iron and Steel Federation, an industry which is protected by high tariffs during the economic 
crisis. Indeed, the committee notes an article by the Manchester Guardian that states that the ISF 
has “a potential stranglehold on the home market”  due to these tariffs. The committee also notes 116
that this has effected other industries which have been grouped together for the benefits of tariff 
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protection or special measures.  The committee condemns this practice calling the cartelisation of 
industry by stating that “the most sinister kind of monopolies, however, are ‘artificial’ or ‘official 
monopolies” . In their attack on monopolies, committee also examines the agricultural sector and 117
the need for economic competition. According to the committee, the official estimates for subsidies 
to the agriculture sector totalled £34 million, with estimates as a high as £60 million . Following 118
on from this the committee goes on to criticise the National Government’s decision to create the 
Agricultural Marketing Boards, as designated by the Agricultural Marketing Act 1931 and expanded 
in the subsequent Agricultural Marketing Act 1933. The agricultural marketing boards were produc-
er-controlled bodies set up by statute to regulate the marketing specific goods. This was then cou-
pled with the 1933 act which enabled marketing schemes to provide for qualitative regulation of 
producers' sales of their products and provided for regulation of imports of agricultural commodi-
ties . Both of these acts subsequently, coupled with the general import duties, as specified by the 119
Import Duties Act 1932, increased the cost of food and the state’s control over the marketing of 
food. The Ownership for All committee were damning about this decision and the subsidies provid-
ed under the act. The Committee wrote: “The fact is that, under this regime of government-engi-
neered monopoly, Britain is fast becoming a corporatist state, and unless the nation turns to the Lib-
eral Party, the only alternative will be complete State Socialism” . 120
 However, the Committee’s first proposal to solve the issue with corporatisation of the 
British economy was to call for the restoration of the old liberal mantra of Free trade. The commit-
tee wrote “As the first and fundamental step towards breaking this type of monopoly, we urge the 
restoration of Free Trade and the abolition of quotas and other restrictions.” . The theory behind 121
free trade has already been discussed in relation to Robbins earlier in this thesis. However, it cannot 
be understated the role free trade played in the psyche of the nation as it was not just an intellectual 
argument for the betterment of society but a political religion for many in Britain, particularly in the 
Liberal Party. Keynes himself - an ardent free trader until 1931 when he advocated tariffs , re122 -
marked that in the 1930s that “I was brought up, like most Englishmen, to respect free trade not 
 Ownership for All p.8117
 Ownership for All p.8118
 R.C Hinton, The Agricultural Marketing Act 1933,  Journal of proceedings of the Agricultural Economics Society, 119
May 1934 Volume 3, Issue 2 p70-81
 Ownership for All p.8120
 Ownership for All, 3-4121
 Cambridge University: King’s College Archives Centre, JMK M/2/110 - 111, A Policy for National Reconstruction 122
(May 1930)
!36
only as an economic doctrine… but almost as a part of the moral law” . Indeed, when free trade 123
came under attack in 1903 by Joseph Chamberlain, a member of the Unionist Government of Arthur 
Balfour, calling for tariff reform, the subsequent campaigning by both sides became increasingly 
heated. By the general election of 1906, the Conservative Party was in open civil war over the issue 
of tariff. Winston Churchill, the Conservative MP for Oldham, crossed the floor and joined the Lib-
eral Party after fiercely rejecting the arguments in favour of protectionism. The Liberal Party, con-
versely, were united behind the mantra of free trade. The party’s campaign that year focused entire-
ly on free trade advocating the same argument Cobden had done in the 1840s that free trade made 
everyone more prosperous, with posters of the era showing shops full of low price items for con-
sumers . The Liberal Party went on to win the 1906 election by a landslide securing 400 seats . 124 125
This theme continued for the Liberal Party throughout the interwar years advocating that the main-
tenance and subsequent restoration of free trade was economically imperative. This was no different 
with Dodds’ Ownership for All Committee and remained a consistent feature of Liberal Party poli-
tics throughout the interwar period. Indeed, the committee write that “Concealed taxation, we sug-
gest, should be abolished altogether, and also all protective taxes, and the effort should be made to 
reduce the revenue duties on foodstuffs, with the ultimate view of establishing “a free breakfast ta-
ble” . What free trade represented was not just an economic argument but a moral one that society 126
will be better off if trade barrier are removed. This trade liberalisation became a focus of the ‘free 
market’ economy of post-war Britain and the early neoliberal movement in Britain with the same 
argument being re-interpreted for modern audiences by linking prosperity to the free market.  
 The Ownership for All committee’s policy solutions, derived from this principle of free 
trade, went further when discussing the monopolistic practices aforementioned. The Committee at-
tacked the agricultural marketing acts and called for the corporatisation of industry to cease. The 
committee write “we recommend the repeal of the relevant clauses of the Agricultural Marketing 
Acts. Thirdly we propose that price fixing (except in the case of propertied articles) should be made 
illegal; and also have measures designed to close an industry against new entrants.” . The attack 127
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on the corporatist nature of the UK economy, under the National Government protected by tariffs, is 
based on this belief in free trade as the driver of prosperity, which was the same arguments being 
advanced by the economists, like Robbins at the London School of Economics during this period. 
Although, the idea of free trade had been a defining factor of the Liberal Party throughout its histo-
ry, this reaffirmed commitment to the idea of economic internationalism would become a defining 
argument of the neoliberal movement arguing for a more open economy during the era of state-
owned enterprises brought in by the Attlee government following the War.  
 However, the Ownership for All committee whilst sharing significant similarities with 
British classical liberalism was not a report based on continuity. The committee reported on the 
methods to assist those without property. In a section titled the Propertyless Three Quarters, the 
committee argued that the key to economic growth was individuals. This was an age in which most 
people in Britain did not own their own property and in the context of the Great Depression the 
committee attempted to address this imbalance. The committee identified that the monopoly of 
property and the concentration of ownership was a significant cause of the mass disenfranchisement 
of individual property ownership. Indeed, the committee remarked that “Once the present tendency 
towards monopoly and concentration is reversed, men will feel that the wind of freedom is blowing 
again. The paralysis of proletarianism will be broken, and the workers will begin to think of them-
selves less as a class foredoomed to the status of “hands” and more as citizens with a stake in the 
concerns in which they work and with the chance to achieve competence” . The committee saw 128
that the disenfranchisement of the majority of citizens as issue to create a more equal society and 
that socialism’s attraction was based on the redistribution of wealth from vested interest. This con-
cern that the mass of citizenry is reduced to the role of hands is detrimental to society and, as men-
tioned before, based on the British classical liberal idea of individuals having a ‘stake’ in society 
because of their ownership of property. The committee suggests that “In a country where a large 
number of comparatively small businesses flourish, a country where an increasing number of per-
sons own small property, there will be a new sense of opportunity for everybody.”  By attacking 129
monopolies, the committee believes this will assist in unlocking mass property ownership allowing 
a greater diversity of ownership for individuals. Indeed, although the idea presented is redistributive 
this document differs from the redistribution envisioned by socialism. Socialism and socialist policy 
during this period, as represented by the Labour Party, sought to redistribute wealth through in-
crease taxation on the wealthy and the nationalisation of large industries such as shipbuilding and 
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coal-mining to redistribute wealth to the less fortunate and create a more equal society. It is the last 
point, however, where the Ownership for All committee differs from classical liberalism and social-
ism. The call for nationalisation which was advocated by the Labour Party’s constitution in 1918 is 
a transfer of power from private interest to public ownership, however, although the industry is to 
be run in the name of the collective, the individual has little power in this system as the ultimate 
control of those industries is with the state thus meaning that power and the crucial ‘stake’ in soci-
ety that property-ownership provides is mitigated by the state and held by a higher authority in the 
common good. Conversely, the British classical liberal tradition is one of limited intervention. As 
mentioned previously, classical liberals would only traditionally legislate if the individual is at risk 
such as the Factory Acts of 1833 banning young children from working, whereas, British classical 
liberalism of the nineteenth century in Britain would be unconcerned with the extent of property 
ownership and would not legislate to change this fact, preferring to focus on the ideas of self-help 
as the response to poverty. This is where the truly radical nature of the Ownership for All committee 
comes in, the fact that the committee is concerned with the propertyless three quarters is due to the 
blend of classical liberalism and Edwardian ‘New’ Liberalism, evident in the Liberal Party during 
this time, with its redistributive elements, comes into the ideas the committee espouse. Indeed, Ed-
wardian ‘New’ Liberals had attempted to introduced a land value tax, as envisaged by Henry 
George - an american journalist and land reform campaign - in the 1909 People’s Budget to finance 
social welfare policies. This tax was subsequently removed from the final budget bill following a 
constitutional crisis which led to the Liberal Party won but costing them most of their majority 
gained at the 1906 election in the two elections in 1910 . However, Georgism and the idea of 130
greater access to land was a cornerstone of Edwardian ‘New’ Liberalism, and indeed received wide-
spread support with the Liberal campaign song, The Land heard at political rallies up and down the 
country during the crisis with its rallying cry “Why should we be beggars with the ballots in our 
hand, God gave the Land for the People!” . By attacking the government monopolies of the Iron 131
and Steel Federation, as well as the Agricultural Marketing Boards, the committee is identifying the 
root cause of the problem and their proposed solution of setting up anti-trust boards, similar to the 
United States, and breaking up the ‘official’ government monopolies created by the National Gov-
ernment. These policy proposal are consciously designed to create a distinctive Liberal alternative 
to the ideas of socialism, the corporatism of the National Government and the inaction of classical 
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liberalism. Indeed, the attacks on the monopolies of the 1930s and the solution of breaking them up 
is an early form of the privatisation and deregulation which came to characterise not just post-war 
neoliberal institutions such as the Institute for Economic Affairs but the Thatcher Government of 
the 1980s.  
 This theme of departure from older ideas continues in the concluding sections of the com-
mittee’s report, in the penultimate section This is Not Laissez-Faire the committee is consciously 
distancing itself from the older classical liberalism, whilst using many of the intellectual arguments 
of British classical liberal tradition to justify their points. The committee writes that: 
“This policy is not one of laissez faire. Quite the reverse. It would involve determined, and 
even drastic, State action at numerous points. Such action, however, would not take the 
form of Government control or management except possibly in the case of certain “natural” 
monopolies, or provide services which private enterprise cannot, or does not supply.”   132
It is in this penultimate section that the Committee is seeking to distance itself from the idea of lais-
sez-faire capitalism by highlighting that, at certain points, state action is necessary. However, the 
committee goes on to argue that the point of this interventionism by the state is for the state to cre-
ate the conditions in which a free economy can flourish: 
 “Its main objects would be to create the legal structure in which a free economy can best 
function; to see that the market is efficient and honest; to outlaw restraint on trade; to break 
down unjust and artificial privileges; to preserve the national resources, and secure that they 
are used to the best advantage; to maintain and expand the social services; and to “place 
before all the opportunities of a full life hitherto only open to the rich” (Resolution of Lib-
eral Party Assembly, May 29th, 1937)”  133
To the Ownership for All committee, the state is only to intervene to create the conditions for the 
economy to correctly function. The removing of restrictive practices, tariffs and official monopolies 
as detailed throughout the policy section of the Ownership for All committee’s report is designed to 
remove the artificial barriers erected by both the laissez-faire capitalist system and the State. The 
committee emphasises this fact by stating that “the Liberal view is that it is the function of the State 
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“to create the conditions of liberty” (f.n Preamble to Liberal Party constitution); but not to direct the 
economy or attempt do what individual citizens can do much better for themselves and for the 
country” . Although, the committee distances itself from the concept of Laissez-Faire, the argu134 -
ment it proposes is that the state is there as the facilitator of the ‘free economy’ by creating the legal 
framework for individuals to be at liberty to direct their own economic choices. The document con-
cludes with a statement by the Ownership for All committee which ties the strands discussed in this 
chapter together. The committee argue: 
“The real issue is the conflicts which rend the world to-day is simple - is the individual citi-
zen to be regarded as a person: or is he to be treated as a dot on a chart, a number in a regi-
ment, a cog in a machine? One the one side stands the various collectivist or quasi-collec-
tivist systems - Fascism, Communism, Socialism, “Planned” Capitalism. On the other 
stands Liberalism. The State, it proclaims, exists for the individual, not the individual for 
the State. Personality is the supreme value. Property is an extension of personality - a bul-
wark of freedom, an indispensable instrument of self-direction. In defiance, therefore, of 
the prevailing trend, we raise the banner of “Ownership for All” and call on all who care 
about human liberty and dignity to follow” .  135
It is these two sections which draw together the intellectual argument of the Ownership for All 
committee. The committee’s focus on the classical liberal ideas of property-ownership, the individ-
ual as the key, free trade and, the rule of law all represent continuity in Liberal thought which the 
committee was trying to continue. However, the practical proposals and the solutions presented in 
this report represented a break from the classical liberal tradition of laissez-faire, represented by the 
Liberal Party in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. Dodds and the committee uses the core tenets of 
classical liberalism as the intellectual bedrock on why the committee is advocating not only for a 
restatement of liberal values but how liberalism can bring about a freer economy. From John Locke, 
and later Hayek, in his Road to Serfdom, the rule of law is of paramount importance to the order and 
structure of society and that it is the responsibility of the law not only to protect private property but 
to also govern the system which the Ownership for All committee espouses. In addition, the concept 
of liberty and individual freedom is again constant throughout the report of the Ownership for All 
committee, the individual is still regarded by the committee as the most important aspect but that 
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legislation can assist in creating the necessary conditions for an individual’s freedom to be best 
served. Indeed, this legislating to create the conditions of a ‘free economy’ is not inconsistent with 
classical liberalism and British neoliberalism too maintained this fact. As Jeppe von Platz and John 
Tomasi note “Classical liberals have not been hostile to regulating economic agency, if it turns out 
to better serve the good of society, as we have already noted regarding the threat of monopoly”  136
indicating that although classical liberalism places individualism and economic liberty at the centre 
of its conceptualisation of the state and the economy, classical liberalism does allow for some inter-
vention within the economy within its own theoretical framework. This ideological underpinning in 
the belief of in the individual based on negative freedom and the ability to make rational choice 
based on their own economic interest, in the case of Smith and, happiness, in case of Bentham is at 
the core of British classical liberal discussions about the role of the state and the individual. This 
means that the Ownership for All committee should be seen as a distinctive document which blends 
the British classical liberalism with the ideas that in the post-war era would be the arguments pro-
mulgated by British neoliberal thinkers such as Ralph Harris, Arthur Seldon and Alan Peacock call-
ing for the restoration of the principles of the free economy in the post-war world. 
III 
Following the German invasion of Poland in 1939, the government immediately began to gain con-
trol over more section of economic and social life in Britain. This was because the management of 
resources and the means of production became crucial to the total war effort. As a result of the total 
war: rationing was introduced, factories and private property was commandeered by the state and, 
labour was directed centrally in aid of the war-effort. On the Home front, dance halls and cinemas 
were closed for public safety, Church bells were silenced, a blackout was introduced and, restric-
tions on water usage came into effect. This was a unique situation for a unique time and the level of 
control over economic and social life was the highest experienced by the British people since the 
Great War. However, the vast majority of the public supported the government’s intervention as for 
many who had struggled during the 1930s received assistance through rationing. Indeed, the public 
mood was reflected well in the Beveridge Report or Report on Social Insurance and Allied Ser-
vices into social welfare. Beveridge, who had left the LSE in 1937 to become Master of University 
College, Oxford was commissioned by the wartime government to conduct an enquiry into social 
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deprivation in Britain. The report proposed a social insurance system to tackle the five giants of 
poverty: want, idleness, squalidness, ignorance and disease. The report advocated numerous solu-
tions to solving these five giants of social deprivation including increases to old age pensions, ma-
ternity payments and, a social insurance system to fund those out of work and the creation of a Na-
tional Health Service. Beveridge, who was involved in the early 1906-1914 liberal reforms and a 
product of the Edwardian ‘New’ Liberalism, argued that tackling these social issues would lead to a 
better life following the conclusion of the War. Indeed, the Beveridge report largely became the 
blueprint for the Attlee administration, with the National Insurance Act 1946, National Health Ser-
vice Act 1946 and National Assistance Act 1948 all inspired by Sir William Beveridge’s report.  
 The increasing acceptance of state interventionism amongst the British political class did 
cause alarm amongst those who had opposed such arguments in the 1930s. In the Conservative Par-
ty, a leftward shift was being to formulate led by individuals such as Lord Hailsham and Harold 
MacMillan, who wrote The Middle Way in 1938 calling for a mixed-economy with state and busi-
ness working together. This shift in the younger generation of Conservative MPs meant that follow-
ing the War, the economic and social interventionism of the Labour administration was tacitly ac-
cepted by the Conservative governments of Churchill, Eden and Macmillan in the 1950s. However, 
not all people were enthused with this shifting attitude. Arthur Seldon, who was still involved in the 
Liberal Party following his work on the Ownership for All report, published The Drift towards the 
Corporate State. The Drift towards the Corporate State was published by the Liberal Party Organi-
sation, the central body of the party’s executive in 1941. The main premise of Seldon’s argument 
was similar to what the Ownership for All committee had decried in 1937, the corporatist nature of 
the British economy in the form of monopolies. Seldon believed this process was being accelerated 
by the war and that the policy of official monopolies was now being advocated as a model for the 
post-war world. Seldon wrote “the tendency in the 1930s to the formation in many basic industries 
of joint monopolies of employers and workers for the exploitation of consumers” . For Seldon, 137
just as he had discussed when writing the Ownership for All committee’s report was that individuals 
are left without choice because of the official sanctioning of monopolistic industry, sanctioned by 
the state. Indeed, Seldon warned about the potential dangers of this corporatist practice in terms 
similar to Hayek’s Road to Serfdom. Seldon argued that “It is the corporatist system of industrial 
organisation, which is incompatible with parliamentary democracy; it is the British variant of what 
in Italy is called Fascism” . Seldon’s link between increasing planning and with fascism, similar 138
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to the Ownership for All committee and later in Hayek’s Road to Serfdom highlighted that the risks 
of increasing state interference would not only be the detriment of society but lead to a slippery 
slope towards totalitarianism. Seldon was not, however, calling for a return to laissez-faire, on the 
issue of natural monopolies, Seldon advocates for state regulation to keep monopolistic actions in 
check rather than public ownership, pointing out that this would require increasing state action to do 
so . Seldon sees the role of the state in such as situation as “State action to ‘cleanse’ industry of its 139
avoidable monopoly; and this will involve a more active State, a State more conscious of the condi-
tions and consequences of monopoly” . Seldon is drawing on a common theme with the early ne140 -
oliberals that the state can have a positive role in creating the conditions for a well-functioning 
market. Whereas lassiez-faire is based on the concept of negative freedom, what Seldon is saying is 
that there is a positive aspect to state intervention within the market economy. Hayek would come 
to this conclusion in his Road to Serfdom, which will be explored in more detail in later in this 
chapter Seldon’s biographer Colin Robinson notes of the Ownership for All report and Seldon’s The 
Drift towards the Corporate State that “all of these papers can be seen as early versions of the ar-
guments in favour of competitive markets and against state monopoly which Seldon deployed to 
such effect in his later work” . Seldon was not the only one within the Liberal Party to object to 141
this development towards interventionism. The committed individualist and Liberal Party member 
Ernest Benn founded the Society for Individualists in reaction to the increasing state encroachment. 
The organisation was dominated by individualist members of the Liberal Party with some conserva-
tives supported Benn’s organisation. The organisation would have an impact in bringing together 
‘individualist’ conservatives and liberals member, creating a group dedicated to the cause of free 
market economics, limited intervention and above all the primacy of the individual which following 
the war created a network which allowed connections and relationships to be made between those 
unhappy with the post-war consensus.   
 Arguably, the most important single work produced during this period in the development of 
British neoliberalism is the publication of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom in 1944. The Road to Serfdom 
was written by Hayek between 1940-1943, when the London School of Economics was evacuated 
to Cambridge due to the Second World War. The Road to Serfdom not only represents a turning 
point in the development of British neoliberalism but also a change in the method of argument by 
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its author. Hayek, throughout much of his time at the LSE in the 1930s focused primarily on the 
technical questions of economics; as seen in his opposition to Keynes’ methodology in the LSE/
Cambridge debates. However, with the publication of the Road to Serfdom, we see Hayek as less of 
an economist and more of a political theorist. David Green attributes this change from technical 
economics to the theoretical underpinning of a free economy to the rise of the Nazis during the 
1930s, which so alarmed Hayek, forcing him to change his priorities .  This changing priorities 142
meant that the Road to Serfdom became the first codified expression of Hayek’s justification of the 
free economy and his rejection of ‘planning’. The key purpose of Hayek writing the Road to Serf-
dom is to warn of the dangers of planning with the key argument being that whilst socialist redistri-
bution sounds good as a theoretical concept, in practice it can led a country towards totalitarianism 
as the state begins to assume more control over the individual until the individual lives in a totalitar-
ian state where individual liberty is second to the collective good. To demonstrate his point, Hayek 
primarily relies on Germany, arguing that the Weimar Republic and the redistributive and interven-
tionist governments of 1920s Germany were largely responsible for Germany’s slide towards totali-
tarianism. However, although The Road to Serfdom is an attack on socialist theory and a critique of 
the concept of ‘planning’, his work is predominately a defence of classical liberalism, particularly 
the British tradition and experience in liberal thought. Hayek, in his introduction, begins his defence 
of classical liberalism by highlighting the trend he is seeing in the British public towards state inter-
vention due to the war and compares it to the German experience of Social Democracy. Hayek 
writes the warning: “There exists now in this country [Britain] certainly the same determination that 
the organisation of the nation we have achieved for the purposes of defence shall be retained pur-
poses of creation. There is the same contempt for nineteenth century liberalism, the same spurious 
‘realism’ and even cynicism, the fatalistic acceptance of ‘inevitable trends’. And at least nine out of 
ten of the most vociferous reformers are so anxious we should learn from this war are precisely the 
lessons which the Germans did learn from the war and which have done so much to produce the 
Nazi State” .  143
 Although Hayek’s thesis predominately focuses on Germany’s slide towards dictatorship, 
and how British academics have wrongly attributed this as a capitalist reaction to socialism, Hayek 
makes frequent references to Britain and British theorists throughout his work. Indeed, Hayek states 
that the British are at risk of losing and abandoning the economic Liberalism which, in Hayek’s ar-
gument, the British largely pioneered.  Hayek states plainly that: “We are rapidly abandoning not 
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the views merely of Cobden and Bright, of Adam Smith and Hume, or even Locke and Milton, but 
one of the salient characteristics of Western civilisation as it is grown from the foundations laid by 
Christianity and the Greeks and the Romans. Not merely nineteenth and eighteenth century liberal-
ism, but with the basic individualism inherited by us from Erasmus and Montaigne, from Cicero 
and Tacitus, Pericles and Thucydides is progressively relinquished” . Hayek is pointing out to his 144
British audience the intellectual history of British liberalism by invoking the names of Adam Smith, 
John Locke, Cobden and Bright and the risks involved in abandoning this tradition of thought but 
he also links it with the idea of individualism, which to Hayek is at the very core of western civili-
sation. Hayek also states that the West has "progressively abandoned that freedom in economic af-
fairs without which personal and political freedom has never existed in the past” . Indeed, Hayek 145
laments throughout the Road to Serfdom this fact by highlighting praise for Bismarck is readily 
available in modern English literature but William Gladstone is rarely mentioned  and that the 146
“outstanding examples of the political wisdom [Lord Acton, A.C Dicey et al] of liberal England, are 
to the present generation largely obsolete Victorians” . Hayek, at heart was an Anglophile, in 1938 147
he was naturalised as a British citizen , and was deeply attached to the ideas of British classical 148
liberalism, as was his tutor Ludwig von Mises. Hayek expresses throughout the Road to Serfdom 
the fear which had been prevalent during the 1930s, both at the LSE and in the Liberal Party that 
the philosophical idea of Liberalism and liberal economics, is no longer of importance as a guiding 
philosophy of political economy.  
 Although Hayek is rejecting the tendency of the ‘planners’ to interfere with the economy for 
fearing of eventually going to such an extreme as totalitarianism and defending the older ‘nine-
teenth century’ ideas of classical liberalism throughout the Road to Serfdom, he is also critical of 
the shortcomings in classical liberalism which he seeks to defend. In the chapter “The Abandoned 
Road” Hayek charts the history of liberal thought and it is in this section where the Road to Serfdom 
is a work which takes a critical look at not just socialism and collectivism, fascism and commu-
nism, but also as he sees the failures of nineteenth century classical liberalism. One particular aspect 
above all which receives Hayek’s critical analysis is laissez-faire, which he partly blames for the 
abandonment of Liberal ideas and the drift towards collectivism. Hayek states that the  principle of 
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laissez-faire has done great damage to the cause of liberalism as Hayek sees it, writing that the 
“wooden insistence of some liberals on certain rules of thumb, above all the principle of Laissez-
Faire which has done more harm to the liberal cause than any other” . Although this may seem 149
unusual given Hayek’s warnings about the coercive power of the state intervening in the ordinary 
transactions of individuals, Hayek’s critique of laissez-faire should not be surprising despite it being 
often overlooked in analyses of his work. Hayek starts by stating that the basic principles of liberal-
ism are not stationary or fixed but do have a degree of fluidity. For Hayek, although the core strands 
of philosophy are present such as the belief in the individual and the rule of law throughout the 
Road to Serfdom, Hayek takes one aspect as the core purpose of liberalism is that “in the ordering 
of our affairs we should make as much us as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and re-
sort as little as possible to coercion, is capable of infinite variety of application. There is, in particu-
lar, all the difference between creating a system within which competition will work as beneficially 
as possible, and passively accepting institutions as they are.” . This passage is highly significant in 150
understanding Hayek’s views on liberalism, laissez-faire represents the passive acceptance of insti-
tutions as they are and as such are a misapplication of the liberal creed which to him is not the best 
way in which to progress liberal views. Hayek, in this passage is conveying the point that the pur-
pose of liberalism and its role is society is to create the framework in which coercion on the indi-
vidual is limited and that the spontaneous forces of society are utilised as possible.  
 Here is where the ideas of the Ownership for All committee and Hayek’s Road to Serfdom 
intersect, despite Hayek having no hand in the writing of the Ownership for All committee’s report. 
This rejection of laissez-faire indicated a shift within those who adhere to the strands of British 
classical liberal thought to redefine what it means to be liberal. Both Hayek and the Ownership for 
All committee highlight the structural issues with Laissez-Faire by the 1930s and 1940s. Indeed 
Hayek points out that “No sensible person should have doubted that the crude rules in which the 
principles of economic policy of the nineteenth century were expressed were only the beginning, 
that we had yet much to learn, and that there was still immense possibilities of advancement on the 
lines on which we had moved” . For Hayek, liberalism seemed to stand still once the immediate 151
tasks of dealing with the monetary system and preventing monopoly were solved; liberalism was 
not able to utilise government as a force for good . This meant that classical liberalism became to 152
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be viewed as a ‘negative’ creed, similar to how Isaiah Berlin explained in his work on positive and 
negative freedom. Hayek highlights this paradox of liberalism stemming from nineteenth century 
economic policy as:  
“While the progress towards what is commonly called “positive” action was necessarily 
slow, and while for the immediate improvement liberalism had to rely largely on the grad-
ual increase in wealth which free and important about, it had constantly to fight progress 
which threatens this progress. It came to be regarded as a “negative” creed because it could 
offer to particular individuals little more than a share in common progress - at progress 
which came to be taken more and more for granted and was no longer recognise as the poli-
cy of freedom” .  153
This paradoxical situation, as Hayek sees it, is formed fundamentally out of the inaction of laissez-
faire liberalism to build on its successes and triumph. The ‘positive’ nature of the freedom it gener-
ated: in the increase of wealth, prosperity and industry were ignored and instead classical liberal-
ism, as Berlin defined, became a negative creed. Indeed, for Hayek, this paradox meant that because 
of the freedom granted in the first instance by liberalism, individuals became unable to tolerate so-
cietal ills as they appeared to be unjustifiable . This slow progress and lack of adaption caused by 154
laissez-faire in Hayek’s argument led to a “growing impatience with the slow progress of liberal 
policy, the just irritation with those who used liberal phraseology in defence of anti-social privi-
leges”  that they turned more towards the need for change. It is in this situation in which Hayek 155
sees the Abandoned Road, in which the chapter is named, as people seek solutions not by “improv-
ing and adding to the existing machinery, but of completely scrapping and replacing it” . This to 156
Hayek is where the issue of planning and collectivism began to inspire the next generation into the 
twentieth century in which “socialism displaced liberalism as the doctrine held by the great majority 
of progressives” . Ben Jackson, points out although Hayek was not as vocal in his criticism of 157
nineteenth century liberalism, he was very careful to distance himself from the principle of laissez-
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faire . Indeed, Jackson elaborates further that people such as Hayek and Robbins were not as criti158 -
cal of nineteenth century liberalism, they were not the “paleo-liberals” of the same type as von Mis-
es who was in fact the only author of this group to defend uncompromisingly the nightwatchman 
state . Hayek is highlighting the core value of liberalism is the individual is free from coercion but 159
that does not mean that the government cannot be a force for good. Hayek is remaining in the 
bounds of British classical liberal thought but is highlighting that the principles are not fixed on the 
concept of lassiez-faire. This distancing from laissez-faire signifies the cumulative arguments each 
made at different times at both the LSE and in the Liberal Party but now codified by Hayek in the 
Road to Serfdom. Indeed,  the Ownership for All committee came to the same conclusion as Hayek 
on the issue of laissez-faire that government can be used to create the conditions for freedom, as 
long as there are checks and balances in the form of the rule of law. Hayek quipped on the liberal 
paradox the nineteenth century is telling that “It might even be said that the very success of liberal-
ism became the cause of its decline. Because of the success already achieved man became increas-
ingly unwilling to tolerate the evils still with him which now appear both unbearable and unneces-
sary” . 160
 However, although the Road to Serfdom is attacking the drive to ‘planning’ Hayek also of-
fers extensive commentary on how he conceptualises the state’s relationship with the individual of-
ten drawing on the aforementioned classical thinkers and ‘English ideas’. For Hayek, the basic 
function of the state is to protect the freedom of the individual and provide the system in which 
economic freedom is governed. To that end, Hayek primarily focuses on the concept of the rule of 
law to achieve that end. Hayek defines the rule of law as “stripped of all its technicalities this means 
that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand all - rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers 
in given circumstance and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.” . In161 -
deed,  Hayek states in his footnote the inspiration for his definition of the rule of law by referencing 
the “classical exposition by A.V Dicey in The Law of the Constitution (8th ed., p198) the rule of law 
“means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the 
influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, or prerogative, or even dis-
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cretionary authority on the part of government” . Hayek does point out that in England a technical 162
narrowness developed as a result of Dicey’s work but the older meaning of the rule of law was a 
well established tradition in England . Hayek is clearly setting out that his views on the rule of 163
law are partly based on the ideas of British classical liberal theorists like A.V Dicey drawing links 
with his conceptualisation of the state and rule of law highlighting the interdependent nature of 
classical liberalism and the emergent neoliberalism in Britain during this period. Hayek goes onto 
further defining the difference between formulating the framework in which individuals are guided 
by and aware of and the concept of the individual being directed in a system of planning directing 
the individual’s actions. For Hayek, as the legislator is just a normal man, the fallibility is present 
and as such the coercive power of the executive must be checked . Hayek characterises this idea 164
of the rule of law as based on formal rules as the means of being “instrumental in the pursuit of 
people’s various individual ends” as formal rules are the “instrument of production, helping people 
to predict the behaviour of those with whom they must collaborate” . Conversely to Hayek, the 165
role of a ‘planning authority’ cannot be tied to pre-agreed formal rules or provide opportunities to 
unknown individuals, and as such the threat of arbitrary power increases. As Hayek notes: 
“When the government has to decide on how many pigs are to be reared or how many buses 
to run, which coal mines to operate, or at what price boots are to be sold, these decisions 
cannot be deduced from formal principles, or settle for long periods in advance… In the 
end somebody’s views will have to decide whose interests are more important; and these 
views must become part of the law of the land, a new distinction of rank which the coercive 
apparatus of government imposes on people”    166
  
Indeed, to clarify this Hayek uses the analogy, utilised by Walter Lippmann of the Highway Code as 
an example of formal rules. The Highway Code governs the way in which individuals should be-
have on the road but the distinction is that no one is telling them where to go. The Highway Code 
acts as the formal guidelines on how to predict the behaviour of other roads users, signposts high-
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lighting routes but not ordering those routes to be taken . In the Road to Serfdom, Hayek concep167 -
tualises the paradox between planning and the rule of law in two ways a) economic and b) moral/
political. On the issue of the economic side of the relationship between the State and the Rule of 
Law, Hayek writes: 
“The state should confine itself to establishing rules applying to general types of situations, 
and it should allow the individuals freedom in everything which depends on the circum-
stances of time and place because only the individuals concerned in each instance can fully 
know these circumstances and adapt their actions to them.”  168
To Hayek, the state’s function is to provide the framework in which, in the circumstances of time 
and place, the individual is better placed to know how to react in a given circumstance and under 
the general guidelines set in governing economic matters. This at its core one of the principle argu-
ments of British classical liberalism, that the individual knows best how to govern one’s own life 
but that the state is there to provide a framework to assist in that process of governing transactions 
between people. This is where Hayek and British liberal tradition share a common outlook and be-
lief in the rule of law, that it is due to the impartiality of the legal system which acts as the greatest 
protector of individual freedom. Hayek points out the alternative to the system which he conceptu-
alises as the raison d’etat of the State. “If, on the other hand, the state what to direct the individual's 
actions so as to achieve particular ends its actions would have to be decided on the basis of the full 
circumstances of the moment and would therefore be unpredictable. Hence the familiar fact that the 
state “plans” the more difficult planning becomes for the individual.”  Hayek is showing that the 169
rule of law is key for allowing the spontaneous forces, i.e. the individual’s actions to exist indepen-
dent and a crucial part of not just the Austrian School of economics but also a key strand of the ar-
guments made by both Smith and J.S Mill on the concept of the man as an independent agent in 
economic matters. 
 It with Hayek’s conceptualisation of the role of the rule of law in the governance of the 
economy where Hayek’s vision of liberalism and his opposition to central planning becomes most 
clear. Again Hayek reiterates that his opposition to planning is not based on laissez-faire but on the 
argument what is the ‘best way of doing things’. Indeed, Hayek concedes this is largely the premise 
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of, as he sees it, the liberal objection between central planning and collectivism. To Hayek “The lib-
eral argument is in favour of making the best possible use of the forces of competition as a means of 
coordinating human efforts not an argument fully leaving things just as they are” . Hayek goes on 170
to say that this conviction in competition is the best way to guide individual needs and for it to work 
beneficially it needs a carefully thought out legal framework. Indeed, Hayek goes further, in similar 
terms to the members of the Ownership for All committee, by stating that this argument does not 
“deny that where it is impossible to create the conditions necessary to make competition effective, 
we must resort to other methods of guiding economic activity” . It is this belief in competition 171
where for Hayek, planners and liberals diverge. “economic liberalism is opposed to competition be-
ing supplanted by inferior methods of coordinating individual efforts” . Just as Hayek expressed 172
the role of law and the rejection of laissez faire under Hayek’s argument the economic system can 
only function with effective competition. Competition for Hayek is the best system because it re-
moves artificial barriers allowing the individual greater freedom by removing the need for con-
scious social control. It is here where Hayek is reinforcing the basic premise which guided most 
classical liberal theorists. The rule of law to Hayek is what guarantees the freedom of the individual 
and preserves liberty. Indeed, Hayek makes reference to the state as the Rechtsstaat throughout the 
Road to Serfdom. However, Hayek does concede that for competition to work effectively, the prin-
ciples of laissez-faire must be ignored to correct wrongs in the system.  
 Hayek’s conceptualisation of both the government’s role in the economy and the economy 
itself becomes most clear once his objection to laissez-faire is examined in detail.  Hayek, sees the 
state as using the framework of laws to set out general principles and the competition within the 
market directing economic decision. It is a system of spontaneous forces bound together by the rule 
of law. As Jeremy Shearmur highlights “Hayek wishes that the government should provide the 
framework within which economic activity and other forms of voluntary co-operation between peo-
ple can take place” . With this established, Hayek sets out what he considers the basic tenets of the 173
market economy:  
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“It is necessary in the first instance that the parties in the market should be free to sell and 
buy at any price at which they can find a partner to the transaction, and that anybody should 
be free to produce, sell, and buy anything that may be produced or sold at all. And that it is 
essential that any entry to the different trades should be open to all and on equal terms, and 
that the law should not tolerate any attempts by individuals or groups to restrict entry by 
open or concealed means. Any attempts to control prices or quantities of particular com-
modities deprived competition of that power of bringing about an effective coordination of 
individual efforts, because of price changes then cease to register all the relevant changes in 
circumstances and no longer provide a reliable guide for the individual actions.”  174
  
Hayek’s framework for the economy as set out above fully articulates the role which the govern-
ment has to play in the economy and what are the core foundations of the ‘free economy’. Hayek 
identifies these three key aspects as the cornerstone of his conceptualisation of the state and econo-
my. The free and open exchange of goods and services, sold and bought at a price set independently 
by individuals, the free and open access to industry for all those wishing to work or own industry 
and no restrictions on trade by price control or quantities. For Hayek, each of these aspects exist to 
promote individual freedom by utilising competition and the price mechanism effectively under the 
framework of the rule of law. Indeed, the conceptualisation of Hayek’s economy is based on market 
forces, and is a restatement of Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’, a cornerstone of classical liberalism, 
with both the economy being like a ‘nervous system that is capable of regulating the economy be-
cause it conveys an infinite number of messages simultaneously via the price mechanism” as An-
drew Heywood highlights . However, Hayek’s conceptualisation of the economy described above 175
is not theoretical to Hayek, the whole premise of the Road to Serfdom is to highlight to British intel-
lectuals, his primary audience in writing the Road to Serfdom, the fallacy of their arguments to-
wards increasing intervention within the market and to provide a contemporary analysis on the 
trends within British intellectual thought. Each of Hayek’s points can be addressed in the contempo-
rary economy before the Second World War and this is important in understanding Hayek’s reason-
ing for highlighting these points. Hayek notes that a trend has emerged in Britain amongst ‘plan-
ners’ towards a corporatist model of industrial management, by highlighting that certain industries 
are left independent but competition is suppressed by those industries operating in a monopolistic 
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way . Although Hayek does not mention the official monopolies - also identified by the Owner176 -
ship for All committee - such as the Iron and Steel Federation, this statement cannot be taken as in-
dependent to the contemporary nature of the economy under the National Government in the 1930s, 
and the subsequent drive to intervention during the War, which Hayek would have seen its devel-
opment firsthand. Indeed, Hayek quotes a statement by the British periodical The Spectator from 
1939 “there were many signs that British leaders are growing accustomed to thinking in terms of 
national development by controlled monopolies”  but Hayek goes on to add that although this was 177
the position then due to the war this trend has accelerated . Hayek naturally disagrees with the 178
concept of the ‘official’ monopolies and corporatism, as it usurps the power of competition set out 
by Hayek in his conceptualisation of the economy. Hayek sees official monopolies as trapping con-
sumers into a situation where they are at the “mercy of the joint monopolist action of capitalists and 
workers in the best organised industries”  in very similar terms to the Ownership for All commit179 -
tee. Monopoly is a great concern of Hayek as he sees it as planning by an indirect route and a threat 
to the individual’s freedom and choice. For Hayek, this argument becomes one of the state’s duty to 
prevent this infringement on liberty and protect the individual from coercive practises generated by 
monopolistic action. If you couple the official monopolies with Hayek’s references to the mistaken 
belief that Free Trade, another cornerstone of British classical liberalism, as a system designed 
purely to the benefit of England during the nineteenth century and Hayek’s appreciation of liberal 
internationalism, then his reference to restrictions on the quantity and price of commodities become 
clear.  Hayek’s conceptualisation of the role of the state in the Road to Serfdom is ultimately trying 
to defend and reinforce the intellectual tradition which has created the liberal state as he sees it. To 
Hayek, the state can be summarised as a free economy, based on competition, in the framework of 
the rule of law, which in Hayek’s view, maximises liberty for the individual but also creates a fairer 
system with equality of opportunity. This conceptualisation of the state is based on the English tra-
dition of the primacy of the rule of law, as Hayek defines by A.V Dicey, as well as a belief in the 
nature of the free economy derived from Adam Smith and Bentham and Mill on the primacy of the 
individual under a utilitarian argument.  
 However with Hayek’s belief in the free economy he does concede that the state does have a 
duty to intervene in economic matters. He identifies very clearly that the state has not only a duty to 
Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 42176
 The Spectator, March 3rd, 1939, p337. in RS 42-43 177
 Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 43178
 Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 42179
!54
allow fair entrance to the market but also that the government should intervene to stop monopolies 
forming. Furthermore, Hayek identifies specific areas, using examples, that the government may 
intervene on account of general wellbeing. Indeed, Hayek uses the example that restrictions and 
even prohibition of certain substances should exists to protect individual workers. “to prohibit the 
use of certain poisonous substances, or to require special precautions in their use, to limit working 
hours or to require certain sanitary arrangements, is fully compatible with the preservation of com-
petition.” . There is one aspect, however, which is of great interest, Hayek’s views on welfarism in 180
the framework of competition and the principle of freedom. Contrary to popular perception, Hayek 
in the Road to Serfdom does not reject the concept of state assistance to those who are disadvan-
taged or in need of help. Hayek discusses what he considers the ‘equality of opportunity’ and how 
the state can have a positive role in influencing and assisting individuals in their endeavours. Hayek 
notes that freedom would not be inhibited from an extensive system of social services. Hayek goes 
into more depth throughout his work, where he writes an extensive explanation of his viewpoint on 
welfare provision: 
“There is no reason why in a society that has reached the general level of wealth which ours 
has attained, the first kind of security should not be guaranteed to all without endangering 
general freedom…. but there can be no doubt that some minimum of food, shelter, and 
clothing, sufficient to preserve health and the capacity to work, can be assured to every-
body.”  181
Indeed, this would seem surprising given Hayek’s insistence on competition and market forces but 
as Hayek himself has stressed, he does not advocate the concept of laissez-faire which he views as a 
perversion of liberal thought. O’Hear notes that “[On laissez-faire] But such is not, and never was, 
Hayek’s position. In fact, Hayek’s specific repudiation of these extreme positions leaves him vul-
nerable to the criticism that his own position is, contrary to appearance, consistent with quite a high 
degree of state control and interference.” . Hayek is highlighting that the state can intervene to 182
alleviate the suffering of individuals. To Hayek, the concept of the minimum standard of assistance 
which is highlighted in the Road to Serfdom is a theme which Hayek returns to throughout his later 
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works. To fully understand Hayek’s views and relationship with welfarism it becomes important to 
look at these later works to properly contextualise the ideas first suggested in the Road to Serfdom 
and as such merits discussion here despite being out of the exact timeframe of this thesis. Indeed, 
Ben Jackson summarised this situation regarding redistribution best that “Nonetheless, as discussed 
later, in the same work Hayek did endorse the state enforcement of some sort of distributive pattern. 
In this respect, as in many others, The road to serfdom was a transitional work, in which Hayek be-
gan to feel his way towards his mature intellectual position but had not, as yet, fully developed or 
integrated all of its elements.” . In Law, Legislation and Liberty, published in 1973, Hayek advo183 -
cates the cause of Universal Basic Income, which would become a key idea promulgated by neolib-
eral think-tanks such as the IEA during the 1960s and 1970s. With Universal Basic Income, there is 
the assured minimum standard to enable poverty to be alleviated for those who are disadvantaged. 
Hayek writes in Law, Legislation and Liberty, “There is no reason why in a free society government 
should not assure to all, protection against severe deprivation in the form of an assured minimum 
income, or a floor below which nobody need to descend.” . Hayek discusses this further by high184 -
lighting his position is not inconsistent with the concept of the rule of law or an infringement on 
freedom, which he first addresses in the Road to Serfdom and in later works, because “To enter into 
such an insurance against extreme misfortune may well be in the interest of all; or it may be felt to 
be a clear moral duty of all to assist, within the organised community, those who cannot help them-
selves. So long as such a Universal Basic Income is provided outside the market to all those who, 
for any reason, are unable to earn in the market an adequate maintenance, this need not lead to a 
restriction of freedom, or conflict with the Rule of Law.” . In the Road to Serfdom and Law, Leg185 -
islation and Liberty, a link can be drawn between Hayek’s belief in a minimum standard of social 
assistance, with Law, Legislation and Liberty showing a more in-depth intellectual development of 
the points Hayek was making in the Road to Serfdom contextualising not just O’Hear’s point that 
Hayek, in some respects, agrees with state intervention but Hayek’s own premise that for true free-
dom to exist, a minimum standard should be strived for by all. 
 Indeed, in the Road to Serfdom, as well as the minimum standards as set out for food, 
clothes and shelter, Hayek goes further and to an extent agrees with the argument for a social insur-
ance system which can be provided by the state. Hayek writes:  
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“Nor is there any reason why the state should not assist the individuals in providing for 
those common hazards of life against which, because of their uncertainty, few individuals 
can make adequate provision. Where, as in the case of sickness and accident, neither the 
desire to avoid such calamities nor the efforts to overcome their consequences are as a rule 
weakened by the provision of assistance – where, in short, we deal with genuinely insurable 
risks – the case for the state's helping to organise a comprehensive system of social insur-
ance is very strong… There is no incompatibility in principle between the state's providing 
greater security in this way and the preservation of individual freedom.”  186
Hayek is arguing a positive case for state intervention in the framework of his conceptualisation of 
the state based on the ideas of equality of opportunity to assist the poorest in society to be free. At 
the core of Hayek argument is that one cannot have true freedom if a basic standard of security is 
not achieved, and that it is not an impingement on freedom but an enhancer of freedom, as high-
lighted by both the minimum standard and the concept of social insurance. Indeed, it is with welfare 
where Hayek become detached from the dogma of laissez-faire liberalism and where Hayek advo-
cates a different path to older ideas of classical liberalism. Hayek’s attacks on laissez-faire, whilst 
not completely condemning nineteenth century liberalism, indicates Hayek’s desire to update the 
ideas of freedom and liberty at the core of British classical liberalism with the modern issues facing 
society in the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, one could almost argue that although Hayek frames his 
ideas based on the intellectual traditions of British classical liberalism such as the rule of law, the 
primacy of the individual as an economic agent and the market economy, with his tacit support of 
welfare, Hayek is in some respects close to his detractors and shares some characteristics with the 
reforming nature of Edwardian ‘New’ Liberalism. As Ben Jackson points out Hayek, like many of 
the early neoliberals in the 1930s and 1940s is not opposed to welfarism. Indeed, Jackson highlights 
that in early neoliberal writings by Hayek, Henry Simons and Karl Popper - a contemporary of the 
LSE invited at Hayek’s insistence to teach, one of the major policy goals of thinkers such as Hayek 
was support for a state-sponsored social minimum and equality of opportunity . For Jackson, “In 187
this respect, Hayek’s views were not radically distinct from left-wingers who also emphasised the 
extent to which fear and insecurity could undermine the liberty to act of disadvantaged 
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individuals.” . The goal of the Road to Serfdom and other early neoliberals, Hayek wanted to see 188
liberalism tackle the difficult issues facing modern society. Indeed, O’Hear concurs that the central 
purpose of Hayek’s discussions on welfarism in the Road to Serfdom are based on striving for the 
equality of opportunity and opposing planning on defined central goals rather than societal condi-
tions. O’Hear states that “Hayek says is that while we should not plan for particular goals for soci-
ety as a whole (such as controlling prices, setting centralized production targets, or getting incomes 
or wealth to conform to some standard), what we should do is to plan for those social conditions 
which would permit the highest exercise of individual freedom, so that individuals can then best 
make their own plans.” . Hayek’s discussions of the role of the state as an enabler of freedom, in 189
the form of assisting those with limited means, is one which highlights a departure not just from the 
older classical liberal attitude of lassiez-faire but an acceptance of the positive role of the state in 
terms of the conditions of the poor which Hayek outlined in his concept of the state and opposition 
to laissez-faire. Indeed, Hayek’s view on welfarism would later define the lexicon for later neolib-
erals who would call for the state to act as the enabler of freedom.  
 Hayek’s Road to Serfdom had a profound impact on the neoliberal movement following the 
Second World War. The book, which sold out of its first 2,000 copy print-run within days forcing 
Routledge to order another 2,500 more copies but even this could not keep up with demand .  In190 -
deed, Hayek quipped that it had become the ‘Unobtainable Book’ during the latter stages of the war, 
had not just a profound influence on British neoliberals but those on the other side of the Atlantic in 
the United States, when it was published by the University of Chicago Press in late 1944. Hayek’s 
defence of classical liberalism and warning about the perils of central planning in the Road to Serf-
dom represented not just a continuity of intellectual thought between early British liberal thinkers in 
the form of the rule of law, defence of the market and individualism but also a rejection of the ex-
cesses of the ideology. With Hayek’s critique of laissez-faire coupled with his argument for mini-
mum assistance and positive interventionism marks out the distinguishing feature of the emerging 
neoliberal movement in Britain in the post-war era. Hayek’s role as a political theorist is best sum-
marised by David Green. Green highlighted how Hayek has always been an enigma but “at heart he 
is a classical liberal - or an Old Whig, as he prefers. When he sees unfreedom, he wants to remedy 
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it, and when he sees injustice he wants to help” . Indeed, Green’s analysis of Hayek in general is a 191
good description of the Road to Serfdom, it is at heart a defence of classical liberalism, particularly 
the British tradition which he references throughout, but also proposes practical steps which Hayek 
believes will remedy societal ills and protect the freedoms he defends highlighting the influence of, 
but divergence from the original concepts which dominated nineteenth century liberalism in Britain. 
 However, as Keith Tribe correctly notes the Road to Serfdom is not just a polemic which 
defended classical liberalism, it changed some of basic arguments which had been at the heart of 
classical liberalism, in particular, the relationship between political freedom and economic freedom. 
As Tribe points out “For Hayek, the “market” is an abstract, not a substantive, entity; the “perfect 
market” is the counterpart of the liberal state. He appeals to classical liberalism but argues from 
economy to polity; his “road to freedom” now ran through the market to political liberty, and not 
the other way around.” . This would appear to be the case, as Hayek uses the idea of economic 192
freedom as the way of ensuring political freedom throughout the Road to Serfdom. Indeed, Tribe is 
correct in highlighting that a substantial part of the Road to Serfdom is based on classical liberalism, 
but what differentiates the emergent neoliberalism is the inverse relationship of economic freedom 
and political freedom, whereas, in classical liberal doctrine it was the other way around political 
then economic. It is this shift in priorities which truly marks the start of neoliberalism. Whereas, 
before the war Hayek, Robbins and Plant at the LSE and Dodds and Seldon in the Ownership for 
All report sort to reconcile older liberal traditions with the present crisis rather than developing a 
new set of ideas, the Road to Serfdom created a demarkation point in which the relationship be-
tween classical liberalism and British neoliberalism came into being. Instead of focusing on politi-
cal freedom, with economic freedom an important but subservient feature, neoliberalism began to 
develop into its own coherent thought process which placed economic liberalism and freedom at the 
forefront. It is this cultural shift, and a sign of Hayek's evolving ideas, which although subtle marks 
the symbolic point in which British neoliberalism formed. The ideas of classical liberalism became 
the core concepts such as the rule of law and individual freedom, acting as a reference point to serve 
this new conceptualisation of the state as the enabler of freedom though economic means. It is this 
inversion of two concepts, both originating in the British classical liberal tradition, which would 
have a profound effect on the development of post-war British neoliberalism, as the early neoliber-
als seek to no longer defend classical liberalism as an ideology but seek to develop a new language 
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focused more on the economic rather than moral/political reasoning for the state’s relationship with 
the economy.  
IV 
Following the publication of the Road to Serfdom and the subsequent election of the Labour gov-
ernment in 1945 on a broad platform of nationalisation, welfarism, and state intervention, the Ne-
oliberal thinkers of the interwar years found themselves intellectually at odds with the prevailing 
public and political mood. Despite being often on the fringes of debate during the 1930s, enough 
proponents existed to maintain an uneasy status quo between the positions advocated by the early 
neoliberal thinkers in Britain and the wider political class. However, the horror of the Second World 
War and the memory of the mass unemployment during the 1930s led to a leftward shift in the polit-
ical, social and intellectual atmosphere of the post-war era. Although Hayek’s Road to Serfdom was 
widely read in Britain and indeed influenced the Conservative Party’s 1945 election campaign, 
Hayek’s defence of classical liberalism with its positive tenets for reform did little halt the tide to-
wards economic interventionism by the new Attlee administration. Under the 1945-1950 Labour 
government sweeping reforms were introduced to improve the general condition of the people. On 
the welfare side, the party introduced the National Insurance Act 1946, granted wide-ranging cover-
age for sickness and unemployment, as well as the introduction of maternity pay, and crowning 
achievement of the Attlee administration was the introduction of a universal National Health Ser-
vice, providing free healthcare at the point of use to all, with provisions for dentistry and eye-care, 
granting those most vulnerable healthcare provided and financed by the state. However, it was in 
the realms of economic management where the early neoliberals were most objected. The nationali-
sation programme implemented by the Attlee administration reached most sectors of the UK econ-
omy and industrial capacity. The Bank of England was nationalised in 1946, bringing monetary pol-
icy into direct government control. The coal, iron and steel industries were all nationalised between 
1945 and 1951, with both industries being the largest employers in Britain at the time. This was 
coupled with the nationalisation of British Overseas Airways Corporation, airports, the railways, 
canal network and some road haulage companies as well as the docks. Indeed, in this programme of 
nationalising transport, the travel agent Thomas Cook & Sons was nationalised, with the British 
Transport Commission being one of the largest employers in the world when created at 680,000. 
Most of these new industries were managed by commissions, with the British Transport Commis-
sion being the overarching organisation encompassing British Railways, British Waterways, British 
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Road Haulage. The British Electric Authority took over the generation, distribution and sale of elec-
tricity, which had perviously been in private or municipal hands. The National Coal Board was es-
tablished to manage the coal mines.  
 This extensive policy of nationalisation and centralisation of economic power was precisely 
what Hayek, Robbins and Dodds wished to avoid in the 1930s, as competition was replaced by 
state-owned industry and economic planning. In 1951, following the narrow defeat of Attlee’s ad-
ministration to the Conservatives under Winston Churchill, very little was reversed in terms of eco-
nomic controls. The Conservatives accepted Labour’s spending plans for the National Health Ser-
vice, most of the nationalised industries remained under state control, except the Iron and Steel in-
dustry which was denationalised in 1953. However, broadly the Conservatives - who had mod-
ernised largely under the influence of the Tory Reform Group in the late 1940s - accepted much of 
Labour’s nationalisation and social welfare plans. This led to what historians have come to recog-
nise as the ‘Post-War consensus’ in which the two major parties - Labour and Conservatives - 
broadly followed the Keynesian mixed-economy and social welfare policies which had developed 
during the war .  193
 It was in this climate of increasing state intervention which caused the early neoliberal theo-
rists to change their tactics. Before the war, the early neoliberal thinkers were trying to defend the 
global order, economic liberalism was under threat but that threat had not come to pass. With the 
War, the need for government control over the economy to fight a total war against Nazi Germany 
had led to a cultural shift in the minds of politicians, the press and the general public. The war had 
brought into sharp contrast the issues which had faced Britain before the war and a desire to not al-
low them to return. Unemployment and poverty in the depressed areas had generated a situation 
many considered indefensible. The war had acted as the catalyst which pushed the planning agenda 
forwards, if economic planning could win the war, then it stood to reason that economic planning 
and intervention could win the peace. With the advent of the nationalisation programme of the At-
tlee government and the acceptance of welfarism and the mixed economy by the Conservatives, the 
early neoliberals were without influence and had seemingly lost the argument, their ideas consid-
ered inappropriate for the Post-War world. Brigin summarised the issue as “The social philosophies 
that had justified capitalism and imbued it with a sense of legitimacy for much of the nineteenth 
century had little purchase on a public with enduring memories of the Great Depression.” .  194
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 It is here where the arguments of the early British neoliberals change from defending their 
ideas and justifying them with what had intellectually proceeded them into how they can overturn 
the consensus and make their ideas the economic mainstream again. Instead of justifying their opin-
ions in the traditions of British classical liberalism, as this thesis has shown, the late 1940s and 
1950s created a situation where economic liberalism needed to be rebranded and not just as a revi-
sion of classical liberal thought. To accomplish this, the early British neoliberals needed a new lan-
guage to explain and advance their ideas as well as a new mechanism outside of the traditional in-
fluence-centres in British society: parliament, the universities and the press. Their response was 
simple; the creation of groups independent of institutions and political parties to advance the cause 
of market liberalism and convince people that market solutions were the best way to govern society. 
This response came from Hayek himself. Hayek believed that the revival of liberalism could only 
come from convincing intellectuals of the merits of the market liberalism but in the face of the pre-
vailing consensus, the old methods and arguments were simple not appropriate to the post-war era. 
To do this, Hayek suggested the formation of intellectual groups designed to influence opinion 
makers - politicians, academics and the media - to support their arguments on the structuring of the 
economy and society. It is at this stage where British neoliberalism moves from its infancy, a de-
fence of classical liberal ideas adapted to the issues of the depression and moves towards maturity, a 
distinctive ideological concept with institutions being created to advance this cause. The early ne-
oliberals were no longer defending a system and warning of the dangers of deviating from limited 
intervention, they now had to actively counter the new post-war political culture which had devel-
oped. What then formed were two organisations which would have a profound effect on the devel-
opment of neoliberalism not just in Britain but globally. Those two organisations are the Mont Pè-
lerin Society (1947) and the Institute of Economic Affairs (1955).  
 The first organisation was founded by Hayek himself and was designed to bring liberal 
scholars from across Europe and the United States together to revive the cause of liberalism. Fol-
lowing Hayek’s successful lecture tour in the United States, he became convinced of the need for an 
organisation of like-minded individuals to discuss the crisis in liberalism after the war. Hayek’s de-
cision to found a think-tank was partly due to the reception the Road to Serfdom had generated on 
both sides of the Atlantic. In the United States, Hayek’s work was considered a partisan document, 
with the Reader’s Digest version omitting some of Hayek’s subclauses changing the meaning of his 
statements. As such, proponents of Hayek’s argument in the US used his Road to Serfdom to attack 
the New Deal economy created by Roosevelt, whilst opponents attacked his work as reactionary 
and a defence of laissez-faire. Whereas in England, the Keynesian consensus was now secured, 
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Hayek found himself alone due to the opposition generated by his work. Indeed, Hayek himself 
noted “Keynes was disputed as long as he was alive - very much so. After his death, he was raised 
to sainthood… At about the same time, I discredited myself with most of my fellow economists by 
writing the Road to Serfdom, which is disliked so much.” . It was in this climate of feeling intel195 -
lectually isolated following the reaction to the Road to Serfdom which prompted Hayek to create the 
Mont Pèlerin Society. Indeed, Hayek believed that he was not alone in feeling isolated in the intel-
lectually hostile world of being a proponent of liberal economics. Brigin notes in a letter from Lud-
wig von Mises to Hayek that free-market academics felt isolated in world where Keynes and Laski 
were most influential for their critiques on market mechanisms . Hayek envisaged the Society as 196
“The organisation which seems to be needed is something halfway between a scholarly association 
and a political society…a kind of international academy of political philosophy… a closed society, 
whose members would be bound together by common convictions”. Hayek’s idea for a conference 
was not a new one, as he had before the war attended the Colloque Lippmann, dedicated to Walter 
Lippmann’s The Good Society, in 1938 which was a meeting designed to discuss the crisis in liber-
alism. As Wapshott notes at the Colloque, Hayek, Von Mises, Robbins, Wilhelm Röpke were all in-
vited and it was this grouping which would form the basis of the new organisation Hayek was hop-
ing to create. Indeed, once back in England, Hayek sent a memorandum to colleagues and friends 
advocating the creation of a new organisation. In his memorandum, Hayek argues that this need for 
a new discussion group was based on fragmented nature of intellectual discourse as a result of the 
war. Hayek’s memorandum stated that “The War has divided the world into an number of different 
intellectual islands, separated from each other as never before in modern history” . Hayek was 197
calling on his fellow liberal theorists to come together to discuss a new path for post-war liberalism.  
 However, for Hayek’s idea to become reality he required funding for his new organisation. 
To finance it, Hayek sought out donors throughout 1946. Eventually the main body of the confer-
ence’s funding was obtained from Dr Hunold, a swiss businessman, who assisted Hayek in the ad-
ministration and financing of the conference. In addition, the cost of the travel for the delegates 
from the United States was obtained from the Volker Fund who fully financed the American dele-
gates travel to Switzerland for the Conference . With the funding secured the Mont Pèlerin Soci198 -
ety was convened at the Hôtel du Parc, a hotel on the summit of Mont Pèlerin in April 1947. Hayek 
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invited 60 to the first Mont Pèlerin conference, in the end 38 were able to attend. Howson notes that 
Hayek had received 30 replies very quickly, including Robbins who Hayek had remarked in corre-
spondence how much Hayek needed Robbins to be present . As well as Robbins, Hayek had invit199 -
ed a diverse array of scholars from across the United States and continental Europe. Among the at-
tendees were von Mises, Karl Popper, Wilhelm Röpke, Frank Knight, John Jewkes, George Stigler 
and Oxford historian Veronica Wedgwood. Hayek was very conscious of his invitees’ differences as 
he wanted to bring together the various schools of thought and provide an environment for the free 
exchange of ideas. However, there was a pattern to Hayek’s invitees due to the nature of Hayek be-
ing an academic economist; most of his invitees were economists. Hayek later regretted not inviting 
more historians and political philosophers to the inaugural meeting. As Cockett notes a large num-
ber of LSE economists were in attendance or would be invited to join the society at its second meet-
ing in 1949, indeed Sir Arnold Plant joined the group in 1949 and later Arthur Seldon and Ralph 
Harris would be admitted in the early 1960s.  
 The conference lasted ten days and with its basic programme revolved around academic dis-
cussions about important philosophical points in liberalism, as well as the threat to classical liberal-
ism by the zeitgeist towards planning and interventionism. Hayek’s goal in creating the Mont Pè-
lerin Society was twofold. Firstly, he wanted to bring together and redevelop the dialogue between 
scholars which was damaged due to the war, it had been nine years since the Colloque Lippmann in 
1938, so by simply creating the conference, Hayek succeeded in his first objective. However, his 
second objective was the revival of liberalism as an intellectual force which was more difficult. At 
the conference the delegates were painfully aware that their ideas and influence in this new post-
war world on policymakers was virtually non-existent at that moment. As George H. Nash de-
scribed the situation as “The participants, high in the Swiss Alps, were only too conscious that they 
were outnumbered and without apparent influence on policymakers in the Western World” . 200
Cockett notes that “for Hayek, most importantly initially, in an era when almost all Western Euro-
pean countries were at the height of their infatuation with planning and socialism, was for the liber-
al intellectuals to make ‘these questions of policy for a competitive order… once again live issue 
which are being discussed public” . Again Hayek summarised the aims of the Society as one of 201
“Both purging traditional liberal theory of certain accidental accretions which have become attached 
to it in the course of time, and facing up to certain real problems which an over-simplified liberal-
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ism has shirked.” . In Hayek’s inaugural paper to the assembled delegates, Hayek discussed that 202
the group needed to win the battle of ideas by convincing the secondhand dealers of ideas - public 
intellectuals. In his paper to the Mont Pèlerin Society on Free Enterprise and Competitive Order, 
Hayek quoted the concluding paragraph of Keynes’ General Theory in total agreement: 
 “The idea of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is 
ruled by little else. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their 
frenzy from some academic scribbler of the a few years back. I am sure the Power vested 
interests is vastly exaggerated compare the gradual encroachment of ideas. Not indeed 
immediately but after a certain interval; and in the field of economics and political philos-
ophy there are not many who influenced by new theories after they are 25 or 30 years of 
age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians even agitators apply are not like-
ly to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interest, which is dangerous for 
good and evil.”  203
Hayek viewed the Mont Pèlerin Society as the frontline in this battle and that it was the role of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society to being this battle of ideas and counteract the tide towards economic plan-
ning. Hayek’s quoting of Keynes was designed to highlight to the delegates that to win the battle of 
ideas they must focus on convincing people to accept the freedom which the market economy 
brings. As Brigin correctly states that "The Mont Pèlerin Society was founded to counteract what its 
members perceived to be a contrary ideological trend, both in the international political environ-
ment and among the intellectual class.” . However, although the society was founded to tackle the 204
prevailing intellectual climate, Hayek was concerned not to make the Society an organisation based 
on defending outdated principles. Given the diverse nature of the group, the conference at times was 
not always convivial.  Ludwig von Mises frequently got into arguments with more moderate mem-
bers of the Society. Indeed, in one often quoted occasion, Von Mises stormed out of a talk shouting 
that the assembled delegates “were all a bunch of socialists” . Von Mises was certainly on the ex205 -
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treme right of the group in that he was the only one who advocated laissez-faire economics. This 
view is supported by Howson, who notes that Robbins expressed his fears about Mises’ tempera-
ment. Indeed, Robbins said “I fear Mises will be a disturbing element; when I hear him talk I feel 
almost a red” . However, the majority of the delegates assembled disagreed with Von Mises’ un206 -
compromising defence of lassiez-faire and were assembled to counteract the damage done by 
lassiez-faire to the liberal cause. 
 It was left to Robbins to draft the statement of aims of the assembled delegates and these 
focused on six key areas of discussion as well as general statement about the view of the Mont Pè-
lerin Society on the current crisis. Robbins’ Statement of Aims, which was ratified by the assembled 
delegates argued that “The central values of civilisation are in danger. Over large stretches of the 
Earth’s surface the essential conditions of human dignity and freedom have already disappeared.  In 
others they are under constant menace from the development of current tendencies of policy.” . 207
Again, as with so much of the writings of the early neoliberals, contemporary events come to the 
forefront of discussion. Indeed, Robbins’ statement goes on to say “The position of the individual 
and the voluntary group are progressively undermined by extensions of arbitrary power.  Even that 
most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of thought and expression, is threatened by the 
spread of creeds” . Robbins is making a clear case for himself and his fellow Mont Pèlerins that 208
the tide towards interventionism was creating a level of arbitrary power eroding the freedom of the 
individual. Robbins’ statement to the Mont Pèlerin Society diagnosing these issues as Robbins sees 
it, is not unique in the history of neoliberal thought. Before the war, both Hayek and Robbins at the 
LSE were warning of the dangers of the drift away from economic liberalism, the Ownership for All 
report identified many of the aims discussed at the Mont Pèlerin Society and, Hayek’s Road to Serf-
dom all constructed the same premise that individual liberty was under threat from the erosion of 
economic freedom, which in turn damaged political freedom . 
 Robbins goes further than just identifying the trend in the western world towards interven-
tionism and again his diagnosis tallies well with other early neoliberal thinkers operating before the 
formation of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Robbins writes that “The group holds that these develop-
ments have been fostered by the growth of a view of history which denies all absolute moral stan-
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dards and by the growth of theories which question the desirability of the rule of law.” . Robbins 209
is attacking any creed which undermines the rule of law, one of the core tenets of classical liberal-
ism,  not just in Britain but throughout most of the western liberal tradition. For Robbins, as well as 
Hayek, the rule of law serves as an important function of providing the framework in which the 
market can operate to the benefit of society. Robbins also draws on the importance of the competi-
tive market in the group’s opening statement. The idea of the competitive market had informed 
much of the debate at the conference particularly how best to make it function to the needs of soci-
ety. Robbins writes “It holds further that they have been fostered by a decline of belief in private 
property and the competitive market; for without the diffused power and initiative associated with 
these institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be effectively 
preserved.”. Robbins is highlighting the classical liberal origins of his argument, in a similar way to 
which the Ownership for All report does, that private property and the competitive market are the 
guarantors of freedom. The statement contain six key aims of the society which required further at-
tention by the Society. The first three pledges focused on examining the crisis, redefining the state 
to distinguish it between a totalitarian and liberal order and re-establishing the rule of law as the 
guarantor of individual freedom .  These first three pledge can be interpreted as the philosophical 210
underpinnings of the Mont Pèlerin Society, by focusing on the theoretical considerations behind 
why the free-market and competition are the best form of economic governance. The final three 
point related to active goals to be such as the establishment of “minimum standards by means not 
inimical to initiative and functioning of the market” as well as making sure history is not misused to 
justify the ‘creeds hostile to liberty and to examine “the problem of the creation of an international 
order conducive to the safeguarding of peace and liberty and permitting the establishment of har-
monious international economic relations.” .  211
 Robbins’ input into the Mont Pèlerin Society would end following it first conference owing 
to Hayek’s plan to divorce his wife, Hella and marry his cousin. This caused a rift between the two 
and Robbins refused to have anything to do with the Society. The creation of the Mont Pèlerin Soci-
ety was important not just to the intellectual development of neoliberalism globally but more specif-
ically for Britain. As Cockett notes that “the Mont Pèlerin Society was thus drawing together those 
liberal intellectuals in Britain who had no such opportunity for a similar gathering in Britain” .  212
 Robbins, MPS Statement of Aims (1947)209
 Robbins, MPS Statement of Aims (1947)210
 Robbins, MPS Statement of Aims (1947)211
 Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, p.116212
!67
 The Mont Pèlerin Society, although not a pressure group created a model which could be 
utilised on a national level, and more importantly it created a network of academics not just global-
ly, but in nation-states who could communicate with each other in the formalised setting of the aca-
demic meetings of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Indeed, as well as the Society's general meeting, re-
gional meetings were planned at Merton College, Oxford in 1952 and 1953 as well as Gonville and 
Caius College, Cambridge in 1958 organised by Stanley Dennison and Jewkes. Regular attenders to 
these meetings included Robbins, Arnold Plant, Jewkes and several members who became attached 
to the IEA and the Mont Pèlerin Society including Alan Peacock and Graham Hutton . Whilst the 213
Mont Pèlerin Society was not dedicated purely to the revival of market liberalism in Britain, its im-
portance lay in the fact it was trying to revive liberalism not on pre-war grounds but on post-war 
realities based on market liberalism. The state in much of Western Europe was taking on more re-
sponsibilities and the interventionism into economic life becoming more complex, the Mont Pèlerin 
Society was created to develop and refine a new path going forwards. It was not classical liberal as 
before but a new version of economic liberalism divorced from the intellectual baggage of classical 
liberalism, such as laissez-faire.  
 Arguably one of the most important developments in the history of neoliberalism in Britain 
was the establishment of the free-market think tank, the Institute of Economic Affairs. The Institute 
was founded by Antony Fisher in 1955, but, the history of the foundation and the idea for the insti-
tute originated from an earlier meeting between Fisher and Hayek at the LSE in 1947. Fisher, a pas-
sive member of the Conservative Party and a member of Benn’s Society for Individualists had com-
pleted his book the The Case for Freedom that year and wanted to enter frontline politics. At the 
meeting Hayek advised Fisher against entering frontline politics and instead urged him to form an 
organisation dedicated to advancing the ideas which Fisher had taken from the Road to Serfdom in 
the form of an Institute. Fisher described the meeting as one where “His central question was what, 
if anything, could he advise me to do to help get discussion and policy on the right lines… Hayek 
fist warned against wasting time - as I was tempted - by taking up a political career” . Instead 214
Hayek’s advise to Fisher was in “his view that the decisive influence in the battle of ideas and poli-
cy was wielded by intellectuals whom he characterised as the ‘second-hand dealers in ideas’. It was 
the dominant intellectuals from the Fabians onwards who had tilted the political debate in favour of 
government intervention with all that followed” . Hayek was explaining to Fisher his belief in the 215
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power of like-minded individuals, operating as a group such as the Fabians, can have a more pro-
found influence on public policy than a political career. Indeed, Hayek’s suggestion is hardly unsur-
prising given that in 1947 he was preparing for his own internationalised version of what he was 
suggesting for the domestic front in their battle for ideas. Hayek culminated his suggestion by stat-
ing to Fisher that “I [Fisher] should join with others in forming a scholarly research organisation to 
supply intellectuals in Universities, Schools, journalism and broadcasting with authoritative studies 
of economic theory of markets and its application to practical affairs” . Whereas, the Mont Pèlerin 216
Society was based on hearing ideas of liberal intellectuals from across the western world, Hayek’s 
conceptualisation of what would become the Institute of Economic Affairs was concerned with ad-
vancing the cause within Britain. It should be noted at this point, when talking about the ‘second 
hand dealers in ideas’ that the formation of the Institute of Economic Affairs was not primarily con-
cerned with influencing the general public but instead the political and business elites with the ideas 
of the free-market defused downwards via them as the authority figures on such matters. Indeed, 
Chandran Kukathas noted that “Hayek’s political influence has been no less remarkable. He per-
suaded Antony Fisher to abandon his plans for a political career and to devote himself instead to 
establishing an organisation for the dissemination of classical liberal ideas. The Institute of Eco-
nomic Affairs founded by Fisher not only played an important role in changing the policymaking 
climate in Britain but also became the model for many classical liberal ‘‘think-tanks’’ around the 
world.” . Fisher was an intelligent man but he was not an intellectual but nevertheless he was later 217
admitted to the Mont Pèlerin Society in 1951. Hayek’s influence on Fisher cannot be understated, 
although, Fisher was already convinced of the benefits of the free market in creating a prosperous 
society, Hayek formulated a goal in which Fisher’s energies could be channelled by assisting in the 
promulgation of free-market ideas within Britain. However, Fisher’s now new goal on the advice of 
Hayek was not immediately realised and Fisher had to build up his agricultural business to help fi-
nance the institute. That ambition was realised when Fisher introduced battery chicken farming to 
Britain from the United States which made Fisher a millionaire.   
 However, Fisher was not alone in the founding of the Institute as he found other like-minded 
individuals to join him in creating the IEA. The Institute was founded by Fisher as the main donor 
but he received assistance from an number of supporters from the now right-wing of Liberal Party. 
One such individual was Oliver Smedley, a committed free-trader and anti-socialist, was active in 
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Liberal Party and had become acquainted with Fisher as a result of the Society for Individualists. 
Smedley’s commitment to the Liberal Party was strong, standing in over 18 parliamentary elections 
primarily against the Conservative R.A Butler for his Saffron Waldon seat, before his split with the 
party in 1962 over the party’s support for the European Economic Community. Cockett notes that 
by 1955, Smedley was running a bewildering a variety of free-market campaigns out of his offices 
in Austin Friars, London. Smedley was the head of the Cheap Food League, The Free Trade League 
as well as the Council for the Reduction of Taxation . Indeed, Smedley, as Vice-President of the 218
Liberal Party stated his views clearly in 1955. Smedley said “I say and shall continue to say that the 
worst thing you can do with your money is hand it over to be spent by the state… Far better to keep 
it in a money box and sleep with it under your pillow at night. But, better still, invest it in your 
business or someone else’s business. Anywhere else is better than letting it pass through the slippery 
fingers of the State” . Smedley was committed to these causes and of all the people discussed in 219
this thesis along with Ernest Benn could be described as adherents to the old Liberal Party’s mantra 
of laissez-faire. Indeed, Smedley, himself quipped that himself and S.W Alexander ‘as the only ac-
tive free-traders left in England in the 1950s’ . Smedley’s hostility to state action at first may seem 220
strange given that he often tended towards advocating Laissez-Faire, however, Smedley’s power 
within the new Institute was often kept in check by Harris and Fisher. Once Fisher had accumulated 
his wealth, he set about forming the Institute. To Fisher the goal was simple: create an intellectually 
rigorous non-partisan organisation designed to convince ‘the second-hand dealers of ideas’ as sug-
gested by Hayek. At the forefront of Fisher’s mind was not only the conversation with Hayek but 
also the model of the Fabian Society, the socialist think-tank founded in the nineteenth century. 
Fisher was particularly conscious of the success of the Fabians explaining in a letter to Smedley, 
that the socialists succeeded by establishing the London School of Economics and with the help of 
Hugh Dalton and Laski succeeded in influencing a generation of undergraduates about the right 
way to view economics (through the socialist lens) and as such this generation left university and 
advanced those ideas through the media thus influencing the average person. Fisher wrote “Social-
ism was spread in this way and it is time we started reversing the process” . For Fisher, like 221
Hayek, the medium for the was through the formation of the Institute of Economic Affairs. Fisher’s 
vision for the Institute was explained in his letter to Smedley “Therefore the Institute of Economic 
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Affairs has been formed to convey sound economic thought in Universities and all other education-
al establishments” . The Institute was formally constituted on the 9th of November 1955, as a 222
charitable trust for the purposes of education, as donations from companies were tax-exempt under 
such an arrangement. The terms of this trust were broad with the description of the Institute of Eco-
nomic Affairs as “a research and educational trust that specialises in the study of markets and pric-
ing systems as technical devices for registrant preferences and apportioning resources. Micro-eco-
nomic analysis forms the kernel of economics and is relevant and illuminating in the public and pri-
vate sectors in collectivist and individualist societies” . However, the Institute stated in its aims 223
that it was a non-political organisation and had no affiliation to any party. This non-partisanship was 
to ensure that the IEA had a broad appeal and was not tainted by affiliation to one political party. 
Indeed, to make sure that strict political neutrality was maintained Alfred Suenson-Taylor, the 1st 
Lord Grantchester and Smedley were removed in 1959 to ensure that neutrality was maintained.  
 Nevertheless, despite this a large number of the early IEA members were members of Liber-
al Party or liberal activists, however the political neutrality of the IEA was never questioned seri-
ously in the early years despite this link. Both Fisher and Smedley were trustees of the Institute, 
along with Smedley’s colleague at Austin Friars, J.S Harding. As well as the board of trustees, the 
advisory council was made up of Lord Grantchester, the President of the Society of Individualists 
and a Liberal peer who like Smedley wanted to keep Gladstonian Liberalism alive in the Liberal 
Party, as well as three LSE economists and a financial journalist.  To run the Institute on a day to 
day basis, Fisher chose Ralph Harris as Executive Director, a Conservative and former member of 
the Conservative Research Department, who he had met in 1949. The second choice, at the sugges-
tion of Lord Grantchester, who in turn was advised by Arnold Plant, was Arthur Seldon. Lord 
Grantchester made the conscious decision to suggest Seldon because he wanted to give the IEA ‘a 
liberal intellectual thrust’ . Seldon was well suited to this new role, after the war he had spent ten 224
years working for the trade magazine Store as well as being an economic advisor the Brewer’s As-
sociation. Seldon was also active in Liberal Party. It was this background which made Arthur Sel-
don so useful in the early years of the Institute of Economic Affairs. Whereas Ralph Harris was in 
charge of securing funding, arranging meetings with politicians and the press, Seldon was behind 
much of the IEA’s intellectual output. Harris himself described the workload as “Arthur produced 
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the goods and I kept the shop’ and that Seldon was the “engine room’ of the Institute . What 225
makes Arthur Seldon’s appointment as the editorial director of the Institute of Economic Affairs 
important was Seldon’s commitment to economic liberalism, which was formulated through his 
contact with other early neoliberal thinkers examined in this thesis. Indeed Seldon, above all the 
individuals discussed in this thesis highlights the interstitial development of an individual’s ideas 
through interaction with other thinkers and institutions. Seldon was very much a product of the 
London School of Economics during the 1930s. As it has already been discussed, the LSE in the 
1930s was the primary centre for economic liberalism at a time, when as Seldon explains free-mar-
ket economics was under attack by the “hostile anti-capitalist world of the 1930s”. However, in-
stead of supporting the ideas of planning, Seldon sympathised and was more receptive to the ideas 
of Hayek, Robbins and Plant. As a result, Seldon came out of his education at the LSE as someone 
committed to the idea of the market economy, and classical liberalism. As Meadowcroft and 
Reynolds note that “Seldon’s training in classical economics at the LSE instilled in him a belief that 
it was only the market economy that could efficiently and fairly ration scare resources” . Seldon 226
himself drew a link between his experience at the LSE and his position in the IEA, Seldon wrote 
“the LSE of the 1930s lived on in the IEA in the 1950s” . Seldon’s biographer states that “His IEA 227
post gave him the opportunity to develop the classical liberal ideas he had found so attractive during 
his student days, to work out their practical implications for the post-war British economy and soci-
ety and, in combination with like-minded scholars, to publicise the results” . Seldon’s years at the 228
LSE had produced a mind dedicated to the cause of classical liberalism and market economics 
which transitioned well into his post at the IEA.  Indeed, the LSE also served a secondary purpose 
which influenced Seldon’s political philosophy, when he joined the London School of Economics 
Liberal Club and subsequently the Liberal Party. Seldon explained his decision as one in which “the 
Conservative Party was too socialist and the Labour Party too conservative, at least the Liberal Par-
ty sounded right”. With his introduction to Liberal Party politics at university, Seldon went on to 
apply his education at the LSE to Liberal Party policy. His service in writing the Ownership for All 
report as well as his own The Drift towards the Corporate State and his chairmanship of the pen-
sions committee in 1948 all contributed to Seldon’s intellectual development and offered him a 
chance to influence policy. Indeed, his work on pensions in 1947 led to Phillip Fothergill asking 
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him to chair the committee on pensions and its report that argued that the welfare state had put the 
future of Friendly Societies and the voluntary welfare movement at risk was accepted by the Liberal 
Assembly in 1948. Seldon was committed to his ideas and with the twin experiences of the London 
School of Economics and the Liberal Party created in Arthur Seldon, the perfect candidate to evan-
gelise the benefits of the market liberalism during this period. Indeed, Seldon and his wife Marjorie, 
remained very active in the Liberal Party in Orpington throughout the 1950s and 1960s, where the 
party won a surprising by-election victory in 1962, with both serving as presidents of the associa-
tion. 
 Seldon’s goal, as Editorial Director, for the IEA’s publications was simple: the works should 
be short, between 10,000-15,000 words, easy to understand for non-experts and avoid unnecessary 
technical terms. If technical terms were required, they would be fully explained. Furthermore, the 
IEA was to focus on practical policy applying the ideas of market liberalism, particularly the su-
premacy of the price mechanism over interventionist measures advocated by government, as an al-
ternative to the prevailing consensus . Seldon coupled this by creating different styles of IEA pub229 -
lications; such as the Hobart Papers, Occasional Papers and Readings each designed to be a particu-
lar length, originality of the research and cover a wide variety of topics creating a more holistic 
view of the world in a series of works . Above all else, Seldon desired to make sure that the acad230 -
emic standards of the IEA were never in doubt and as a researcher for the Liberal Party, as well as 
ten years in commerce, Seldon was well placed to make sure the intellectual arguments of the IEA 
were articulated to a wide audience, as his biographer Colin Robinson notes . What made the IEA 231
successful was its mantra of ‘thinking the unthinkable’ and certainly in the early years of the Insti-
tute’s foundation, the IEA was set apart from the majority consensus view advocated in public dis-
course. Seldon and Harris set out this task in the spirit of what Hayek originally explained to Fisher. 
As Cockett points out the “modus opandum of the IEA was based on Hayek’s guiding principle, that 
they had to fight and win the intellectual battle over the course of twenty or more years without re-
gard to the short-term political situation” . To Seldon and Harris, they knew the benefit of the free 232
market and market liberalism, it was merely their jobs to convey and evangelise the market econo-
my to everyone else. In the early years, under Seldon’s direction, the IEA produced a steady stream 
of publications on a variety of topics. Cockett notes that “Under Seldon’s direction, the IEA thus 
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tried to apply the principles of economic liberalism to as wide a range of economic activity as pos-
sible” . Indeed, one of the IEA’s first publications was Seldon’s own Pensions in a Free Society, 233
which called for the winding-up of the state pension and the creation of a private pension system . 234
In the early years, the IEA published Hire Purchase in a Free Society, The City’s Invisible Earnings 
by W.M. Clarke and The Future of the Sterling System by Paul Bareau in 1958 as well as Advertis-
ing in a Free Society by Harris and Seldon in early 1959. During Seldon’s time as the Editorial Di-
rector, he edited 350 IEA monographs, authored 28 books and monographs and, wrote 230 arti-
cles . 235
 Throughout the late 1950s, 1960s and the 1970s, the formidable partnership of Ralph Harris 
and Arthur Seldon continued to work tirelessly for the promotion of free market ideas. In 1959, the 
Institute of Economic Affairs hosted the Mont Pèlerin Society general meeting at Christ Church, 
Oxford in which Harris and Seldon presented a paper to the assembled members titled Tactics and 
strategies of the advance to a Free Economy. The paper was designed to explain how Harris and 
Seldon believed the message of market liberalism could be conveyed to wider audience, using the 
Institute as their reference point to promulgate this message. To Seldon and Harris, their approach 
was straightforward. They argued that the “philosophy of the market economy must be widely ac-
cepted; this requires a large programme of education” . To do this they argued, just as Hayek had 236
suggested to Fisher, and Fisher had explained to Smedley, they must tailor their education at vary-
ing levels to target the influencers of opinion; intellectuals politicians, businessmen and journalists. 
Indeed, Seldon and Harris, expanded this much further into a programme of education which could 
be utilised for convincing the opinion-formers arguing that the programme must promote the virtues 
of the market economy, explain that this is consistent with existing moral and political codes and 
thirdly remove misconceptions by explaining them in plain english, as Seldon was doing in his role 
as Editorial Director. Harris and Seldon were explaining what the Institute of Economic Affairs was 
about and how they were determined to overturn the tide of intellectual opposition to market liberal-
ism through a comprehensive system of education in market economics. It was this method that the 
two men continued their work throughout the 1960s and 1970s, they were to produce easy to under-
stand explanations as to why market liberalism is best, regardless of political concerns, and those 
interested would come to learn more from the Institute of Economics Affairs. From the world of 
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politics, early followers included many of those associated who would later serve with Margaret 
Thatcher including Geoffrey Howe, Sir Keith Joseph and before his infamous Rivers of Blood 
Speech in 1968, Enoch Powell. As well as many Conservatives, Jo Grimond - Liberal leader be-
tween 1956 and 1967 and John Pardoe MP, Liberal Party economics spokesman had been known to 
attend IEA.  
 The impact of the Institute of Economics Affairs cannot be understated, from its creation in 
1955, the Institute was at the forefront of disseminating the ideas of economic liberalism during the 
1960s and 1970s helped establish a genuine school of thought behind British neoliberalism which 
could be advanced through the Institute’s work. Indeed, for much of the 1960s and 1970s the IEA 
acted as the one institutional voice in Britain advancing these ideas until other institutions were cre-
ated from the 1970s. Its work and influence spawned several separate organisation such as the Cen-
tre for Policy Studies, set up by Sir Keith Joseph in 1975  and the Adam Smith Institute in 1977 237
set up by Madsen Pirie and Eamon Butler, which all broadly subscribed to the free-market mantra 
the Institute was promulgating from the 1950s. In addition, the papers edited by Seldon and pro-
duced by a wide-range of authors generated publicity for tackling topics considered too politically-
sensitive for the mainstream political parties but would be realised as government policy following 
the election of the Thatcher government and beyond. This was the strength of the IEA, the academic 
rigour of its work, as enforced by Arthur Seldon, which only increased the reputation of the IEA 
overtime as more politician, journalists and businesspeople went to the IEA throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s. Indeed, as Ben Jackson notes, corporate subscriptions to the IEA increased dramatically 
between the 1960s and 1970s, the number of corporate donors to the IEA increased rapidly from 
110 in 1962 to 299 in 1968, where it remained stable at between 250 and 300 . Indeed, a number 238
of IEA publications which later became government policy included the cost of university tuition 
could be covered by loans backed by the state , a comparison between the private U.S telephone 239
system and the public system in the UK which concluded that there was no economic reason as to 
why the telephone system should be state-owned  as well as an attack on the Resale Price Mainte240 -
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nance . Although establishing a link between the influence of the IEA on changes in government 241
policy is hard especially given the distance in time between the implementation of some of the IEA 
authors suggestions, it is testament to the work of the IEA that these ideas eventually did find trac-
tion within mainstream political discourse in the 1980s and beyond. If we take two examples, tu-
ition fees and the telephone paper both published in the 1960s, we can get a sense of the change in 
public policy between then and now. In the case of tuition fees when first published by the IEA in 
1960, the concept would be considered politically impossible for any government to implement the 
policy to the introduction of tuition fees in September 1998, when it was introduced by the New 
Labour government of Tony Blair, a paradigm shift in the public attitude to the role of government 
in providing services had occurred. Indeed, in the case of the telephone system between the IEA 
paper in 1964 and the telephone system being privatised by Margaret Thatcher’s government, the 
first in her programme of privatising state-owned assets, in 1984, Britain had already undergone a 
transformation as the state-owned assets were no longer so sensitive as to cause political damage. 
With both of these IEA papers, it would seem that Hayek’s original concept of the ‘battle for ideas’ 
as advocated to Fisher in 1947, did appear to come to fruition in the public policy debates of the 
1970s, 80s and 90s. It would be spurious to link these exact changes in policy with the Institute of 
Economic Affairs but what it does highlight that from the creation of the IEA in 1956 to the 1979 
election of Margaret Thatcher, the intellectual mood was shifting and the IEA was at the forefront of 
this change. Indeed, as correctly Cockett notes “By the mid-1970s, therefore, the IEA had, over the 
course of twenty years, developed a coherent body of free-market ideas, applicable to all areas of 
the economy. They had articulated a coherent set of principles, the principles of economic liberal-
ism, applicable to a modern economy, thus fulfilling Hayek’s 1947 hope that the economic liberal 
would refine and develop liberalism into a modern, vibrant philosophy” . 242
V 
The intellectual development and origins of neoliberalism in Britain therefore came in two distinct 
strands, the ideas presented by the individuals themselves and the institutions which provided the 
networks for the development, enrichment and promulgating of the ideology. In terms of the devel-
opment of neoliberalism as an intellectual concept, the early neoliberal theorists sought to redefine 
the relationship between the economy and the state, by seeking to redefine what it meant to support 
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a liberal market-orientated agenda during this period. At the forefront of their arguments were the 
traditions of British classical liberalism and classical economics, which often provided the language 
and core ideas to early neoliberal thought in Britain. The concept of a free-economy, the rights of 
the individual and the rule of law, all played a significant part in the formation of the British neolib-
eral view of the state and the relationship between the power of the state and the freedom of the in-
dividual. As this thesis has shown, the Ownership for All committee report and Hayek’s Road to 
Serfdom all tried to explain their reasoning with the language and ideas of British classical liberal-
ism. The Ownership for All report with its call for the expansion of property-ownership as the way 
to provide freedom tallied with the ideas that private property is the bedrock of society. Indeed, the 
issue of property ownership and the land question was a topic of frequent discussion in liberal 
thought for much of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. In the Road to Serfdom, 
Hayek’s conceptualisation of the relationship between the state and the economy was framed in 
term of the rule of law drawing on classical liberal, nineteenth century English thinkers such as A.V 
Dicey and Lord Acton to conceptualise a system of governance based on a firm framework of laws 
designed to allow the free-market economy to flourish. However, whilst the early neoliberal theo-
rists utilised the same language and arguments proposed by classical liberal theorists, they should 
not be mistaken for the same argument rebranded, but redefined. Rather than being divorced from 
classical liberalism, there are clear intellectual stands which can be drawn on to understand the de-
velopment of the emerging neoliberal thought in mid-twentieth century Britain, both stated and un-
stated. The fact that the individual thinkers in this thesis saw themselves as liberals is not to be dis-
missed, as it indicates a level of engagement with liberal theory, however active or passive, which 
assisted in formulating their opinions throughout the period. 
 The early neoliberal theorists which influenced the development of British neoliberalism 
sort to redefine their ‘liberalism’ by utilising their classical liberal forbearers as a reference point 
not the defined, correct point of view. The relationship between the longer tradition of British clas-
sical liberalism and the formation of neoliberalism during mid-twentieth century should therefore 
be seen as a foundation, in which the errors and inconsistencies of classical liberalism could be cor-
rected and refined into a more purposeful conceptualisation of the state and the economy rather than 
classical liberalism under a different name. The core principles expressed in this thesis as classical 
liberal thought: the power relationship between the individual and the State, individual freedom, the 
rule of law, private property all fed into the early neoliberal critiques of economic intervention as 
highlighted by Robbins, Hayek, Seldon and the Ownership for All committee in their critiques of 
monopoly for example. However, the early neoliberal theorists adapted and redefined their critiques 
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based on the problems facing the contemporary world in the form of fascism, communism and na-
tionalism, as it has already been stated a simple defence of the liberal interwar economy was be-
coming increasingly redundant in the world demanding change for alleviating poverty and unem-
ployment, particularly after the Second World War and the election of the Attlee administration. As 
such, the early neoliberals off-loaded a considerable amount of the language closely associated with 
the traditions in British classical liberalism throughout the 1930s and 1940s, above all the concept 
of laissez-faire. Laissez-faire was one of the first concepts to be jettisoned by the early British ne-
oliberals as an erroneous element of liberal thought. To the early neoliberal theorists, the state did 
have an important role to play, it was there to provide the framework - under the rule of law - in 
which economic activity could take and indeed legislate to prevent the formation of monopolies, 
fraud, restricted practices and unsafe working conditions. As Hayek explained in the Road to Serf-
dom, this was all possible without impeding on general freedom. In addition, Robbins in his The-
Great Depression decries the tendency to believe that market liberalisation is laissez-faire, instead 
highlighting the state has important functions such as the governance of maintaining rules for con-
tracts. Indeed, the Ownership for All committee summarised the situation well in describing the role 
of the state is to “provide the conditions for liberty” by quoting the Liberal Party constitution of 
1936. Instead of the state having no business intervening in the market, as per the classical liberal 
argument in favour of laissez-faire, the early neoliberal theorists gave the state an important func-
tion in ensuring that the conditions of liberty existed and were reinforced against wrongdoing. 
However, all of this had to be done though agreed principles and based on the rule of law, it could 
not be done on the grounds of economic planning. For the early neoliberals, the state was a frame-
work, it was not the function of the state to direct economic activity.  
 However, what marks British neoliberalism out as a distinctive concept is the inversion of 
the relationship between the economic freedom and political freedom. Whereas, the British classical 
liberal tradition considered political freedom to be the most important, the early neoliberals be-
lieved that economic freedom naturally led to political freedom. This is most clearly expressed in 
Hayek’s Road to Serfdom in the way he utilises classical liberal doctrines such as the rule of law to 
justify why economic freedom is so important to the individual. Indeed, the Ownership for All 
committee also hints at this, by highlighting with the expansion of property, the individual can be 
free from coercive power. Only with a wider diffusion of property ownership can individuals be 
protected against the coercive powers of state, as referenced by their analysis of fascism and com-
munism in the early part of their report. Political freedom, in neoliberalism becomes subservient to 
economic freedom, as economic freedom is seen as the guarantor of political freedom. This inver-
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sion of the relationship between economic freedom and political freedom is probably the central 
difference between the two concepts, British classical liberalism and British neoliberalism, during 
the early discussions on what would become neoliberal thought. With this inversion of the relation-
ship between political and economic freedom, the early neoliberals were able to portray this fledg-
ling intellectual movement as one based on positive rather than negative freedom. Instead of focus-
ing on the coercive power of the state, as classical liberalism did in terms of the coercive political 
power, early neoliberalism focused on the freedom which market liberalism could provide. 
 The second strand which was important in the intellectual development of neoliberalism is 
the institutions in which the early neoliberal thinkers in this thesis congregated. Whereas the ideas 
came from the individuals, it was the institutions that allowed them to converse and discuss their 
fears about liberalism during this period. The London School of Economics was the first such insti-
tution which acted as a conduit for the emergent British neoliberal thought, with the school’s Eco-
nomics Department under the control of Lionel Robbins becoming a centre for classical economic 
theory. Indeed, with the admission of Hayek to the Tooke Chair and Arnold Plant, the School rapid-
ly gained a reputation as the foremost institution in Europe dedicated to economic liberalism, as 
noted earlier in the thesis. As the reputation of the school grew so did the academics drawn to its 
arguments. As the hotbed for economic liberalism during the 1930s, the LSE’s primary role was 
creating a generation of economists who were well-versed in the ideas of classical liberal eco-
nomics rather than the prevailing and more fashionable studies in planning conducted throughout 
the period. 
 At the same time, the Liberal Party during the early 1930s became a place in which for his-
torical reasons those most keen to defend the free-economy congratulated, however, the organisa-
tion was the first to see the first practical policy ideas trying to blend the ideas of classical liberal-
ism into what would become some of the hallmarks of British neoliberalism. The Ownership for All 
committee’s report, under the chairmanship of Elliott Dodds, saw the first attempt to call for a wider 
diffusion of property through a variety of measures including the graduation of death duties. How-
ever, although the Ownership for All can be seen as distributist document, it should also be seen as 
the first neoliberal expression in the Liberal Party. Indeed, the policies calling for government ac-
tion to rectify monopolies, in the form of reversing the corporatisation of the British economy, 
restoring free trade and suspending subsidies on domestic products would all contribute to greater 
economic freedom for the individual. Indeed, the Ownership for All committee makes the shift 
which Hayek would more formally lay out in the Road to Serfdom, economic freedom is a guaran-
tee of political freedom, which is one of the hallmarks of British neoliberalism, but is explained 
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through the medium of private property-ownership. The future of British neoliberalism was not to 
be found in the Liberal Party, however, as following the Second World War, apart from the Un-
servile State Grouping founded by Dodds in 1953, by the end of the period of this thesis the party 
had undergone a left-ward shift, despite the leader Jo Grimond’s sympathy for the groups aims. In-
deed, following the war there was a noticeable shift between Liberal Party members operating out-
side the party for the advancement of liberal economics rather than in the party by the mid-1950s, 
as shown by the number of liberal activist both in the Society for Individualist and the Institute of 
Economic Affairs, indicating a shift for those interested in developing market liberalism, their goal 
was better served outside of political parties who broadly accepted the post-war consensus.   
 However, above all, the most important institution which helped to truly develop British ne-
oliberalism as a coherent strand of thought is the Institute of Economic Affairs. The foundation of 
the IEA is different however to the other institutions discussed in the thesis; the Mont Pèlerin Soci-
ety, the Liberal Party and the London School of Economics because none of them had the specific 
agenda to promote economic liberalism in Britain as there central goal, the IEA should be seen as 
both the beginning and an end for neoliberal thought in Britain. Whereas, before the network of in-
dividual thinkers was wide-spread, a interconnected web of individuals operating in various institu-
tion, what the IEA came to represent was the focus-point of the new neoliberal ideas which had 
been developing from the early 1930s in the LSE to the culmination in the formation of the IEA in 
1955. Indeed, the IEA represents the break in which neoliberalism becomes a distinctive concept 
focused around the simple premise that market solutions can be found in practical economics rather 
than utilising older forms of liberal traditions that Hayek, Robbins and Dodds attempt to in the 
1930s and 1940s through complex explanations of classical liberal theory in their various work. The 
IEA, on the other hand, focused on the need for practical policy ideas which could eventually influ-
ence politicians skeptical of the post-war consensus. Instead of utilising grand ideas of older liberal 
traditions to form broad ideological justifications for freedom, British neoliberalism became an ide-
ology hard to pinpoint and easily adaptable because it had few central pillars following 1955 other 
than a) economic freedom is critical to the preservation of political freedom, b) government is not 
always the answer to economic issues and c) the market is above all the most efficient way of allo-
cating economic resources. Whereas, Hayek had attempted in the Road to Serfdom to develop a new 
conceptualisation of the state and the economy, whilst utilising the core ideas of classical liberalism, 
the IEA was created to peddle a narrative that market liberalism is best and the philosophical con-
cerns which plagued Hayek, Robbins and Dodds were redundant to Harris and Seldon. British ne-
oliberalism, as advanced by the IEA, became one in which economic analysis and the freedom of 
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the market would be the most discernible features of post-war neoliberalism rather than trying to fit 
it into a broader tradition of liberal thought. To continue the analogy I utilised earlier in my thesis 
regarding the development of neoliberalism: if the London School of Economics and the Liberal 
Party were British neoliberalism in its infancy, the Road to Serfdom and the Mont Pèlerin Society 
were its adolescence, then the IEA would become its drive towards maturity. 
 The early intellectual origins of development of British neoliberal therefore utilised British 
classical liberal thought as a reference point in which to highlight the intellectual tradition of what 
would become neoliberalism. However, classical liberalism was redefined to suit the needs of this 
new intellectual movement and focused on the premise that capitalism is the guarantor of freedom 
against governments by inverting the traditional relationship between political and economic free-
dom. The road to freedom was now based in economics not politics and that is what the early 
British neoliberals sought to show. This emerging ideology formed by individuals and advanced 
though institutions would go on to have a profound effect on late twentieth century politics, inform-
ing what has been dubbed the neoliberal consensus.    
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Appendix One: Free trade posters during the 1906 Election Campaign 
Liberal Party Election Poster (1906), Artist Unknown (London: Liberal Publication Department) LSE Archive Ref: COLL MISC 0519/19 
F.C.G [Francis Carruthers Gould] (London: Waterlow and Sons) LSE Archive ref: COLL MISC 
0519/31 
!85
 Artist Unknown (London: Liberal Publication Department) LSE Archive Ref: COLL MISC 
0519/37 
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Appendix II: The Land 
THE LAND 
(Words: unknown. Tune: Marching Through Georgia; Henry Clay Work) 
Sound the call for freedom boys, and sound it far and wide, 
March along to victory for God is on our side, 
While the voice of Nature thunders o’er the rising tide, 
“God gave the land to the people!” 
Chorus: 
The land, the land, ’twas God who made the land, 
The land, the land, the ground on which we stand, 
Why should we be beggars with the ballot in our hand? 
God made the land for the people. 
Hark the sound is spreading from the East and from the West, 
Why should we work hard and let the landlords take the best? 
Make them pay their taxes on the land just like the rest, 
The land was meant for the people 
repeat chorus 
Clear the way for liberty, the land must all be free, 
Liberals will not falter from the fight, tho’ stern it be, 
’Til the flag we love so well will fly from sea to sea 
O’er the land that is free for the people 
repeat chorus 
The army now is marching on, the battle to begin. 
The standard now is raised on high to face the battle din, 
We’ll never cease from fighting ’til victory we win, 
And the land is free for the people 
repeat chorus 
Words taken from the Liberator Songbook published by the Liberator Magazine. https://lib-
eratormagazine.org.uk/en/document/liberator-songbook#document  (Accessed 1st Dec 
2017) 
!87
